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LIVE PERFORMANCE, COPYRIGHT, AND THE FUTURE
OF THE MUSIC BUSINESS
Mark F. Schultz *
I. INTRODUCTION
A great rock show can change the world, some claim, but can
concerts save the popular music business? Since squeezing reve-
nue out of exploiting copyrights in recorded music has become in-
creasingly difficult, many contend that live performance will be-
come the focal point of the music business. The common claim is
that the concert business will support not only itself, but also
finance the production of studio recordings. This article considers
the viability of business models based on linking freely available
recordings to other revenue-producing activities, particularly live
performance.
As it becomes ever more difficult to persuade people to pay for
recorded music, some suggest that live performance is the last
economic redoubt for musicians-the only unique, excludable,
non-duplicable product left in the music business. David Bowie
summed up the argument nicely in a New York Times interview
several years ago:
"I'm fully confident that copyright.., will no longer exist in 10
years, and authorship and intellectual property is in for such a bash-
* Copyright Mark F. Schultz, 2008. Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University
School of Law. B.A., 1989, George Washington Univ.; J.D., 1993, George Washington Univ.
Law School. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 35th Annual Research
Conference on Communication, Information, and Internet Policy at George Mason Univer-
sity School of Law; the 8th Annual IP Scholars Conference at DePaul University College of
Law; the Works in Progress IP Conference 2008 at American University College of Law;
and faculty workshops at Cumberland School of Law, DePaul University College of Law,
and Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The author wishes to thank the par-
ticipants at those events as well as Michael Carroll, Brannon Denning, Brett Frischmann,
Eric Goldman, Raymond Ku, Stan Liebowitz, Lydia Loren, Michael Meurer, Paul McGreal,
Mark McKenna, Matthew Sag, Alec van Gelder, and Christopher Yoo for helpful com-
ments. He also wishes to acknowledge Brad Powers for his excellent research assistance.
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ing. Music... is going to become like running water or electrici-
ty... . [T]ake advantage of these last few years because none of this
is ever going to happen again. You'd better be prepared for doing a
lot of touring because that's really the only unique situation that's
going to be left."l
Bowie is hardly alone in his visionary musings. It is common-
place wisdom that most musicians make their money on tour,2
and popular commentators regularly proclaim that the era of cop-
yright is over and the era of live performance is at hand.3 Typical-
ly, they believe that musicians will continue to make recordings
in order to build support for their concert business.4
The music business certainly would continue in some form if
copyright protection for recorded works became wholly ineffec-
tive. The recording business is only a subset of the music busi-
ness. Unlike most other creators-for example, the authors of no-
vels and the creators of movies-musicians have an alternative
stream of revenue from live performance that existed long before
copyright and has continued to exist alongside copyright-centered
business models.
The important questions are thus not about the health of the
entire music business or the viability of the existing businesses in
the industry. Change is inevitable. The question is how and why
recordings will be made. If musicians had to finance records with
indirect revenues from touring, how would such a business model
1. Jon Pareles, David Bowie, 21st-Century Entrepreneur, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, §
2, at 1.
2. See, e.g., Peter Kafka, Concert Tours Are Where the Real Money Is, ABC NEWS,
July 11, 2003, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=86535&page=1 ('The top 10 per-
cent of artists make money selling records. The rest go on tour,' says Scott Welch, who
manages singers Alanis Morissette and LeAnn Rimes.").
3. See Posting of Chris Anderson to The Long Tail Blog, http://www.longtail.
comlthe-long-tail2007/01/give-away-them.html (Jan. 28, 2007 20:06 EST) ("Music as a
digital product enjoys near-zero costs of production and distribution-classic abundance
economics. When costs are near zero, you might as well make the price zero, too, some-
thing thousands of bands have figured out. Meanwhile, the one thing that you can't digit-
ize and distribute with full fidelity is a live show. That's scarcity economics.") [hereinafter
Posting of Chris Anderson]; see also John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED,
Mar. 1994, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas-pr.html
("One existing model for the future conveyance of intellectual property is real-time per-
formance, a medium currently used only in theater, music, lectures, stand-up comedy, and
pedagogy. I believe the concept of performance will expand to include most of the informa-
tion economy, from multicasted soap operas to stock analysis. In these instances, commer-
cial exchange will be more like ticket sales to a continuous show than the purchase of dis-
crete bundles of that which is being shown.")
4. See Posting of Chris Anderson, supra note 3.
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affect the quantity, quality and variety of recordings that con-
sumers would enjoy?
For insight, this article draws on two bodies of literature from
economics. The research on the economics of copyright has a great
deal to say about business models that may allow the producers
of copyrighted works to benefit from widespread copying. 5 The
cultural economics literature, very rarely discussed in United
States legal copyright literature, has even more to say about the
viability of live performance as an economic activity.6 This article
draws lessons from these two bodies of literature to consider the
viability of a live-performance-based recording industry.
There are two keys to a sustainable business model based on
indirectly profiting from sharing or widespread copying. First,
there must be a link between the free availability of copies and
the demand for a revenue-producing good or service. 7 Second, the
revenue-producing activity has to be sufficiently remunerative-
ideally, gains will offset the revenue lost to foregoing direct sales,
but at the very least, gains must cover the costs of making a re-
cording, both production costs and opportunity costs. 8 To the ex-
tent either of these conditions is not met, one can expect a reduc-
tion in the quantity, quality, or variety of music-produced copies. 9
The nature of live performance makes it an economically chal-
lenging activity. In this article, I discuss data that I have col-
lected that indicates older, very well-established acts with portfo-
lios of hit records benefit most from touring and may benefit from
file sharing as well.lO Additional data shows, however, that the
"middle-class" of the music business may not be doing as well, as
ticket prices appear to have remained relatively stagnant over
the last ten years.1 1
Part I begins by putting live-performance-based models into
the context of the rapidly changing music industry. The proposed
live performance models, as well as other "free" business models,
deserve serious consideration and response, as the music busi-
5. See discussion infra Part III.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
7. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
8. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
9. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
10. See infra Part IV.B.2, fig.1.
11. See infra Part IV.B.2, fig.2.
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ness is too much in flux to disregard any potential business mod-
el. Part II then summarizes the literature regarding the econom-
ics of business models that indirectly benefit from copying. This
part considers two case studies of businesses that exploit alterna-
tive models for financing content: Red Hat's Enterprise Linux and
Ganz's Webkinz stuffed animals and online games. Part III ap-
plies these lessons to the music business. Part IV concludes by
examining the relative benefits of "free" models and models based
on direct exploitation of copyright.
II. LIVE PERFORMANCE AS AN ALTERNATE MODEL FOR FINANCING
THE CREATION OF RECORDED MUSIC
I have great confidence that we will have the best record company in
the industry, but the reality is, in today's world, we might have the best
dinosaur. Until a new model is agreed upon and rolling, we can be the
best at the existing paradigm, but until the paradigm shifts, it's going to
be a declining business. This model is done.
Rick Rubin, Co-Chairman, Columbia Records, September 200712
One of the most pressing questions in the popular music indus-
try today is finding a viable business model for the future. While
change is a constant in most businesses, large and mature indus-
tries rarely endure changes as rapid and all-consuming as those
the music business is currently facing. Digital technology and
networks are presenting new opportunities and challenges of an
historic nature, and those opportunities and challenges, as con-
suming and transformative as they are, appear ordinary next to
the existential threat represented by file sharing and other forms
of widespread unauthorized consumer copying. 13 Paying for mu-
sic seems to have become voluntary.14
Such challenges naturally have participants and interested ob-
servers of the music business considering and experimenting with
12. Lynn Hirschberg, The Music Man, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at
26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/magazine/O2rubin.t.html?pagewanted
=5&_ r=1.
13. See Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can
Teach Us About Persuading People To Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 651,
658-62 (2006) (discussing file sharing and unauthorized consumer copying).
14. Id. at 655.
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many potential new business models. Few proposals are too radi-
cal to merit serious consideration given the state of the record
business. While the sentiment that musicians can no longer rely
on copyright is radical, it is not completely out of bounds.
This part of the article puts the proposed live performance
model for financing recordings in the context of the wide variety
of business models being considered by the industry. It first de-
scribes the transformative pressures that are reshaping the mu-
sic industry; it then surveys the recording business's serious con-
sideration of alternatives to copyright-supported, direct sales
models; it describes proposed live-performance-based business
models and support for them in greater detail; and finally, it ex-
plains why the viability of live performance as an alternative
model is a relevant and important question for copyright law.
A. The Pressure To Transform Business Models and the Pressure
on Copyright
The recording industry is struggling to adapt to four chal-
lenges, any one of which would probably be sufficient to trans-
form its business. First, as is well known, copyright enforcement
has become much more difficult as technology has enabled con-
sumers to copy with ease on a mass scale.i5 Payment has, in
some sense, become voluntary for large portions of the popula-
tion.16 Second, the cost of recording has declined as recording
technology and editing tools have been transformed by new digi-
tal technology and software.17 Third, the costs of producing and
distributing copies of recording is falling as online delivery dra-
matically extends the potential reach of recorded music, while re-
ducing costs by eliminating the need for most physical infrastruc-
ture.iS Fourth, online communications and communities have
opened up new ways to communicate with potential listeners and
fans.19 This change transforms the marketing and promotion of
recordings, while potentially reducing costs.
15. See id. at 658-68.
16. Id. at 655.
17. See Urs Gasser et al., iTunes: How Copyright, Contract, and Technology Shape the
Business of Digital Media-A Case Study, 54 (The Berkman Center for Internet & Society
at Harvard Law School, White Paper 2004), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edul
media/uploads/81/iTuneswhitePaper06O4.pdf.
18. See id.
19. See Schultz, supra note 13, at 670-75.
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These challenges are affecting and changing every link in the
chain that brings recorded music to consumers, as well as the fi-
nancial model that supports this chain. Some of the changes
present opportunities-challenging ones, but opportunities none-
theless. Others, like file sharing, are calling into question the
viability and necessity of existing business models and of the in-
stitutions like copyright law that support them.
Until the turn of this century, the structure of the record busi-
ness was fairly settled and stable in its broad, general outlines,
relying on record companies and copyright to make it work.20 The
process of getting music to consumers was a relatively high-risk,
high-cost proposition. 21 Record companies have played an essen-
tial (albeit much-maligned) role of absorbing both the risks and
the costs in the recording business.22 The risk in the recording
business results from the uncertainty inherent in creative endea-
vors. Nobody is really certain whether a new type of music, new
artist, or new recording will excite consumer demand.
Record companies manage risk by launching large numbers of
new acts, compensating for the many misses in their portfolios
with the hits.23 The costs of recording, promotion, and distribu-
tion, until recently, have been significantly higher than the typi-
cal musical act could self-finance at the beginning of its career. 24
Record companies have the resources to finance these activities.
In exchange, the companies enjoyed the opportunity to profit from
selling recordings (usually taking the lion's share). So long as
enough of the record label's bands hit, the company would make
money. One of the linchpins of the system was copyright: given
20. See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED To KNoW ABOUT THE MusIc BUSINESS
81-86 (2000).
21. See id. at 81-84.
22. This is a somewhat stylized version of the role of record companies. Standard
record contracts are reviled for pushing as much of the risk and cost back on bands as
possible, which is usually a lot, given the weak bargaining power of bands signing their
first record deals. Record companies provide bands with advances to pay the costs of re-
cording, video production, radio promotion, and other expenses, and then the label recoups
expenses from the band's royalties. Id. at 110, 114. The typical record deal ensures that
the label, and everyone else involved, gets all expenses paid out of royalties and all of its
money out first, long before the band. See id. at 88-91; see also Chuck Philips, A Woman of
Independent Means; Ani DiFranco's Got a Great Royalty Rate-It's Her Label, L.A. TIMES,
July 5, 1996, at D1. Still, if the record does not sell, the record label swallows the losses.
See PASSMAN, supra note 20, at 105. Any entrepreneur who has taken money from venture
capitalists is familiar with the scenario: investors always get paid first.
23. See Philips, supra note 22.
24. See id.
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the ease of copying music, record companies could not have ac-
cepted such risks or incurred such costs if competitors could have
appropriated their revenue stream through copying.
Changing technology has challenged the viability of this long-
standing model enabled by direct exploitation of copyright. Most
urgently, file sharing and other forms of mass consumer copying
have introduced a new kind of risk into the recording business.
The new risk is that copyright will no longer assure that those fi-
nancing recordings-artists, record companies, or others-have
any opportunity to recoup their costs by selling recordings. Even
popular recordings will lose money if people simply copy them in-
stead of buying them. This kind of risk, as opposed to ordinary
business risk, is intolerable. It thus has players in the music
business casting about for alternate ways to make money and
more secure revenue streams. Some change in the business model
seems inevitable.
At the same time, changing technology has also challenged the
necessity of the long-standing business model embodied by tradi-
tional recording companies. As the cost of creating recordings
falls, self-financing becomes less difficult.25 Similarly, digital dis-
tribution drastically reduces the costs of getting music to con-
sumers.26 The Internet provides nearly costless means for pro-
moting and marketing recordings. All of these cost reductions call
into question the traditional rationales for recording companies.
If up-front costs are lower, then less assistance is needed to bring
recordings to market. Moreover, although consumer tastes may
be as unpredictable as ever, lower costs reduce the consequences
of failure. Musicians and other third parties may thus be able to
bear the risk of commercial failure themselves without needing to
engage in the sort of broad "risk-pooling" practiced by record
companies. Thus institutional change also seems likely; not only
25. Jen Fish, Getting the Rock out, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Me.), May 22, 2006, at
D1. ("The digital age is here and the result is cheaper and easier to use audio/video
equipment, which means that today's aspiring rock 'n' roll stars can make music and pro-
mote themselves easily.") There are still some costs that are often overlooked in a rush to
embrace the romantic vision of a musician recording a song in his living room, posting it
on a social networking website, and finding an audience overnight. See Fish, supra; see
also WILLIAM BAUMOL & WILLIAM BOWEN, PERFORMING ARTS-THE ECONOMIC DILEMMA
169 (1966).
26. See Revella Cook, The Impact of Digital Distribution on the Duration of Recording
Contracts, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 40, 40 (2003).
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will business models change, but new players are likely to
emerge.
Indeed, the opportunities presented by the reduced need for
record labels have not been lost on musicians and their potential
business partners. Over the past decade, it has become more legi-
timate and lucrative for musicians to go it alone. Artists with rel-
atively modest followings have achieved financial and critical
success with this strategy. For example, critical favorite Ani Di-
Franco has made a decent living producing music on her own
record label since 1990.27 As an independent, self-published art-
ist, Australian John Butler enjoyed commercial success in Aus-
tralia and won several Australian Record Industry Association
awards (the Australian equivalent of the Grammy awards) in
2004.28 Butler has since gone on to sell records and perform
throughout the world, including an extensive North American
tour.29
The year 2007 may have marked a milestone in the end run
around the record labels, as blockbuster acts followed in the foot-
steps of independents. The Eagles entered a successful exclusive,
non-label distribution deal with Wal-Mart.30 Paul McCartney and
Joni Mitchell did a similar deal with Starbucks, as did the Spice
Girls with Victoria's Secret.31 Madonna also spurned the record
labels, signing a $120 million deal with concert promoter Live
Nation for two albums and exclusive touring rights for ten
years. 32 Since then, AC/DC has struck its own deal with Wal-
Mart,33 and other performers, including rapper Jay-Z, have done
deals with Live Nation.34 In short, easier and more open distribu-
tion and reduced costs have made it more attractive for artists
and new players in the business to cut out the record labels en-
27. Philips, supra note 22.
28. John Butler Trio, Biography, http://www.johnbutlertrio.comlbio.php (last visited
Dec. 20, 2008).
29. Id.
30. Joan Anderman, Life in the Vast Chain amid a Shifting Industry Landscape: The
Eagles Partner with Wal-Mart, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28, 2007, at Ni.
31. Id.
32. Ethan Smith, Live Nation's New Act: Concert Giant Seeks More Business Areas
Where It Can Lead, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2007, at B1; Madonna Leaves Warner for Concert
Promoter, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, at C7.
33. See Ed Christman, Thunderstruck: Retailers Smarting at Wal-Mart's AC/DC Ex-
clusive, BILLBOARD, June 21, 2008, at 5.
34. See Jeff Leeds, In Rapper's $150 Million Deal, New Model for Ailing Business,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2008, at Al.
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tirely, allowing them to retain a greater portion of the rewards
from any success. 35
These circumstances have put most of the pieces in the record-
ing business in play; what happens next is anybody's guess. With
the dire threat of consumer copying to spur them on, music-
industry players and observers are proposing and experimenting
with a myriad of new business models. Much of the conventional
wisdom and most of the settled arrangements in the music busi-
ness are now subject to question.
The possibility for dramatic change seems even more convinc-
ing when one considers just how dramatic the changes in the rec-
orded music businesses have already been. Some of the more set-
tled, mainstream parts of today's music business appear to be
extraordinary innovations from the vantage point of about fifteen
or twenty years ago. For example, online retailers like Ama-
zon.com have vastly expanded the inventory of music available to
consumers.3 6 The typical Wal-Mart carries about five thousand
albums; Amazon carries about a million. 37 This development
created a greater potential for niche markets while reducing dis-
tribution costs.3 8 Also, online services like CDBaby have allowed
musical acts without a record deal to make money distributing
professionally copied and packaged CDs.39 Finally, iTunes proved
the viability of online commercial distribution, while the iPod and
other MP3 players have changed the way people buy music (by
the track) and where they take their music (everywhere).40 These
once remarkable but now commonplace business developments
presage even greater changes to come.
We thus are in a time where even the most seemingly revolu-
tionary proposals must be taken seriously. Business models are
rapidly changing and very few proposals are off the table any-
35. See Devin Leonard, Big Musicians Flex Their Muscle with Record Labels,
FORTUNE, Aug. 21, 2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazineslfortunelfortune-
archive/2006108/21/838 3597/index.htm.
36. See CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL 155 (2006) (discussing the effect of in-
creased consumer choice created by online retailing) [hereinafter ANDERSON, THE LONG
TAIL].
37. See id.
38. See id. at 5-6.
39. Antony Bruno, How To Pull a Radiohead, BILLBOARD, Oct. 25, 2008, at 12.
40. See Sandra Barrera, Carry a Tune; Apple's iPod and Its Competitors Are Changing
the Way We Listen to Music, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Jan. 25, 2005, at U4.
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more, including the record business's copyright-based reliance on
direct sales of music.
B. Serious Alternatives to Copyright-Centered Business Models
The dramatic transformation of the music business has led
many to believe that the future of recorded music lies elsewhere
than with copyright. Some of the new business models being se-
riously considered by the music industry and commentators thus
would completely or partly abandon reliance on the direct exploi-
tation of copyright. These discussions and experiments are driven
by a combination of pessimism and optimism about the future-
pessimism about the viability of directly selling music and optim-
ism about the declining costs of production, distribution, and
marketing.
Some of the proposals betray a hint of desperation, or at least
indicate a hope that virtue can be made of necessity. For example,
Rick Rubin, Co-Chair of Columbia Records, has observed that the
current business model based on direct sales of physical product
is "done."4 1 He has also expressed the opinion that the iTunes' di-
rect digital sale model would become obsolete. 42 Instead, he con-
tended that a monthly subscription model would allow consumers
to download all the music they wanted for a flat monthly fee
which, in his estimation, could grow the music business to ten
times its current size. 43 Rubin's status as a "guru" 44 perhaps en-
courages such visionary pronouncements. Other music industry
executives of equal rank, but lacking guru status, are more will-
ing to admit to cluelessness. For example, Doug Morris, CEO of
Universal Music Group, recently admitted that the record busi-
ness "just didn't know what to do [about digital technology]. It's
like if you were suddenly asked to operate on your dog to remove
his kidney. What would you do?"45 After long battling change,
Morris has pushed forward digital-rights-management free music
41. See Hirschberg, supra note 121.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Sarah Rodman, Metallica's "Death" Has Plenty of New Life, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 12, 2008, at D1.
45. Seth Mnookin, The Angry Mogul, WIRED, Dec. 2007, at 202, 208.
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sales on online retailers and has moved to create a fixed, monthly
fee online subscription service called Total Music.46
Despite the fact that Rubin and other commentators sometimes
hail online subscription services as a new idea, they have actually
been up and running for a number of years. Napster, once the
scourge of the music industry, was reborn a few years after its lit-
igation-induced demise as a subscription service that focuses on
large, university customers. 47 The services typically enter agree-
ments with universities that pay a flat, per-student fee.48 Some
users complain about the limitations on the services-there are
restrictions on transferability49 and downloads expire with the
user's subscription50-but they appear to be a significant, al-
though thus far limited, alternative to the older direct sale model.
Another proposed model that abandons the centrality of copy-
right is the government-administered collective license. This
model, embraced by a number of scholars, would allow consumers
to download music (and perhaps other media) for personal use,
free of copyright restrictions.51 To support the recorded music in-
dustry, the public would pay a tax or "levy" on income or on some
set of goods used to copy or enjoy music. 52 Detailed discussion of
46. Id.
47. See Nick Wingfield, College Students To Get Free Access to Napster Service, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 7, 2003, at B5.
48. See id. (noting one such agreement between Napster and Penn State University).
Penn State has since switched to Ruckus, an online ad-supported subscription service that
boasts over 700,000 subscribers as of fall 2007. William Colsher, Ruckus Gains Users,
DAILY COLLEGIAN (State College, Pa.), Sept. 20, 2007 available at http://www.collegian.
psu.edu/archive/2007/09/20/ruckus-gains-users-2. aspx.
49. Ruckus is not compatible with Macintosh computers. See Leslie Finlay & Lauren
McCormack, PSU Signs with Ruckus, Ends Service with Napster, DAILY COLLEGIAN (State
College, Pa.), Apr. 27, 2007 available at http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2007/04/04-
27-07tdc/04-27-07dnews-07.asp. The songs may not be transferred to an iPod, and there is
a fee to burn songs to a compact disc. Id.
50. Amanda DeBard, Piracy Legislation Would Require Colleges To Act, DAILY TEXAN,
Nov. 15, 2007.
51. A number of prominent scholars have proposed various forms of compulsory or
blanket licensing as an alternative to the current system of direct sales of recordings. See,
e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT 199-203 (2004); Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards a
Liability Regime for File-Sharing, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 57-66 (2004). See generally
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Eco-
nomics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Im-
pose a Noncommercial Use Levy To Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1 (2003).
52. See FISHER, supra note 51, at 217-23; Gervais, supra note 51, at 4-7; Ku, supra
note 51, at 311-22.
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this model is beyond the scope of this article, but it represents yet
another proposed departure from the copyright-centric direct
sales model.
Other scholars have contended that falling costs and alternate
forms of production enabled by networked communications ob-
viate the need for full exploitation of copyright. Some, notably Yo-
chai Benkler, have celebrated the possibilities of amateur produc-
tion as a replacement for the exploitation of copyright. 53 The
Creative Commons movement, spearheaded by Larry Lessig, en-
courages creators to renounce some of their rights in an effort to
grow the public domain and encourage collaboration. 54
As of this writing, the mainstream music industry seems more
willing than ever to engage in radical experimentation. For ex-
ample, in October 2007, the popular band Radiohead tried an ex-
periment with a "tip jar" model of remuneration. 55 Fans could
download advance .mp3 files of Radiohead's latest, self-released
album in exchange for a self-determined price-which could be
set as low as zero. 56 Radiohead has not released sales figures, but
some fairly unscientific estimates are that it collected $6 to $10
million in revenues on the first 1.2 million downloads during the
initial days of the experiment. 57
C. Live Performance as a Business Model for Supporting the
Recording Industry
Yet another alternative business model for the record business
proposed by some is the subject of this article: reliance on reve-
nues from live performance. Some contend that even if enforcing
copyright against consumer copying were completely impractica-
ble, performers would still make recordings in order to spur de-
mand for concert tickets. In discussing this article, I have found
that a significant minority is surprised that the live-concert-based
model is advocated or taken seriously at all, while another sizable
53. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006).
54. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CUTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW To LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 282-86 (2004).
55. See Posting of Eliot Van Buskirk to Wired Blog Network: Underwire, http:/blog.
wired.com/underwire/2007/10/fans-to-determi.html (Oct. 1, 2007, 13:10 EST).
56. Id.
57. Posting of Eliot Van Buskirk to Wired Blog Network: Listening Post, http://blog.
wired.com/music/2007/10/estimates-radio.html (Oct. 19, 2007, 11:35 EST).
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group finds the model to be beyond question.58 It is therefore
worthwhile to describe the support that this model has and some
of the reasons for that support.
In a deal that has been heralded by some as a sign of things to
come, the world's largest concert promoter, Live Nation, struck a
$120 million deal with Madonna that "makes Live Nation the pop
star's exclusive partner for merchandise, recorded music, touring
and other music-related businesses for 10 years."59 The arrange-
ment has garnered a great deal of attention for both its novelty-
a concert promoter acting as a record label-and size.60 The par-
ties believe that this large, innovative deal is justified by a rever-
sal of the traditional relationship between the record business
and the performance business.61 Madonna's manager, Guy
Oseary, described the change this way: "In the past, people would
tour to promote their albums; today they put out albums to pro-
mote their tours.... The pendulum has swung, and Live Nation
is at the forefront of touring."62
Many share this view of the ascendance of the live performance
business, leading them to contend that live performance and oth-
er related revenue sources hold the key to the future of the rec-
orded music business. Proponents of this model believe that di-
rectly charging consumers for recorded music is becoming less
viable, but that musicians will still produce recordings because
they serve an important promotional function.63 As a Live Nation
executive described the rationale for the recording portion of the
Madonna deal, the company was not motivated by the opportuni-
ty to make money selling recordings, but instead planned to "bal-
ance the album-related expenses against revenue from more prof-
itable businesses like merchandise."64 Recording is thus seen as a
necessary promotional expense for other, more profitable busi-
nesses like touring and merchandising.65
58. See infra Part IV.
59. Smith, supra note 32.
60. See id.
61. See id.; Madonna Leaves Warner for Concert Promoter, supra note 32.
62. Smith, supra note 32.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. See id.
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There is plenty of precedent for supporting the creation of orig-
inal music through live performance. Before recording technology
ever existed, some musicians supported the creation of new music
with performance. For example, Mozart sold subscriptions to
works-in-progress, entitling his subscribers to attend the perfor-
mance of the completed work.66 Beethoven derived some of his in-
come from his great skill as a pianist, and he created a competi-
tive advantage as a performer by creating original compositions
so difficult that only he could play them well.67 Today, many mu-
sicians continue to make a living by performing their own works
and those of others. Some superstars like Madonna, U2, and the
Rolling Stones make a fortune.68 Some do not make much, but to
the extent they are making anything at all, it is mostly income
from performance. Jazz and folk musicians, symphony orchestras,
and jambands often fall into this category.
As copyright owners find it increasingly difficult to prevent un-
authorized copying, the unique, excludable nature of live perfor-
mance begins to look relatively more attractive. Popular technol-
ogy business writer Chris Anderson69 describes the attraction
like this:
Music as a digital product enjoys near-zero costs of production and
distribution-classic abundance economics. When costs are near ze-
ro, you might as well make the price zero, too, something thousands
of bands have figured out. Meanwhile, the one thing that you can't
66. MAYNARD SOLOMAN, MOZART: A LIFE 290-92 (1995).
67. BARRY COOPER, BEETHOVEN 45 (2000); see MAYNARD SOLOMAN, BEETHOVEN 78
(2d ed. 1993).
68. See Daryl D, Twenty-Five Years After Her Debut, Madonna Still Leads the Way,
BLOGCRITICS MAGAZINE, Oct. 12, 2007, http:/fblogcritics.org/archives/2007/10/12/082750.
php; Louis Hau, Another Record Year for the Concert Industry, FORBES, Jan. 4, 2008,
available at http://www.forbes.com/2008/01/04/concert-revenues-2007-biz-media-cx_lh-01
04bizconcert.html; Rolling Stones, U2 Help Drive Concert Revenues to Record in 2005,
USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.comllife/music/news/2005-12-
29-concert-tour-money x.htm.
69. Anderson is currently editor-in-chief of Wired magazine and author of the best-
selling business book The Long Tail. See About Me, Long Tail FAQ, http://www.thelong
tail.comlabout.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2008). Anderson's much-heralded "Long Tail"
theory describes the consequences of a new economics of abundance, where producers and
retailers are able to make a vast amount of digitized content available to consumers on
demand at low cost. See ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL, supra note 36, at 5. Among the con-
sequences celebrated by Anderson are vastly improved opportunities for niche producers
and greater satisfaction of consumer preferences because of improved choices and in-
creased variety. See id. at 6, 8-9. Anderson's primary insight is that there are tremendous
business opportunities that have heretofore not been exploited in the "long tail" of the dis-
tribution of demand. See id. at 10-11.
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digitize and distribute with full fidelity is a live show. That's scarcity
economics. 70
As recordings come to resemble public goods (non-excludable and
non-rivalrous in consumption), some see the salvation of the mu-
sic business as lying in the non-copyable, eminently excludable
live concert experience.
Many other commentators have shared Anderson's belief in the
performance-based business model for recorded music, with vari-
ous levels of enthusiasm. Activist and songwriter John Perry Bar-
low 7l was an early promoter of live performance in an influential
and sweeping 1994 essay that questioned the viability of intellec-
tual property, predicting that the model of "real-time perfor-
mance, a medium currently used only in theater, music, lectures,
stand-up comedy, and pedagogy ... will expand to include most of
the information economy."72
Some copyright scholars, while less bombastic than the popular
press, have embraced similar visions of live performance playing
a central role in the music business. For example, Yochai Benkler
has forecast the end of the era of copyright as a means for sup-
porting the production of music:
The solution must assume that peer-to-peer file sharing is here to
stay and that attempting to stamp out flexible, adaptive, general-
purpose personal computers and criminalize one of our most basic
social-cultural practices will, and ought to, fail. Once we understand
that, we can focus our energies on the range of solutions that have
been suggested-from government funding to tip jars and perfor-
mances-that aim at preserving the livelihood of artists, not the
twentieth-century business model of industrial cultural produc-
tion.73
70. Posting of Chris Anderson, supra note 3.
71. Barlow is a lyricist for the Grateful Dead and other bands and was co-founder of
the technology-related civil liberties group the Electronic Frontier Foundation. See Bar-
low, supra note 3.
72. Id.
73. Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Shar-
ing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 353 (2004) (citations omit-
ted).
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Several economists who study copyright have advocated similar
views,74 as has the Nobel Prize-winning economist and New York
Times columnist Paul Krugman.75
Perhaps most consequentially of all, record labels, desperate to
find new revenue streams, have begun to seek a portion of tour
revenue in so-called "360 deals."76 Signaling this new thinking,
Warner Music Group ("WMG") chair Edgar Bronfman, Jr. aban-
doned the label "record company" in 2007 and instead took to re-
ferring to WMG as a "music based content company"77 as he
touted the development of new revenue streams other than the
direct sale of recorded music, including from touring. 78 Although
the details of 360 deals are not yet widely reported, The New York
Times gained access to a 360 deal offered by Atlantic Records.79 It
included the "conventional cash advance to sign the artist, who
would receive a royalty for sales after expenses were recouped,"
but it also included an "option to pay an additional $200,000 in
exchange for 30 percent of the net income from all touring, mer-
chandise, endorsements and fan-club fees."80 Some record indus-
try executives contend that these deals will benefit not only the
industry by giving it a fresh revenue stream, but will also benefit
artists by allowing record labels to invest more patiently in an
artist's career by freeing the labels from the "tyranny of mega-
hits."81
Not everyone is sold on the viability of the new 360 deals or the
Live Nation/Madonna deal. "Many talent managers view 360s as
a thinly veiled money grab and are skeptical that the labels, with
74. See Amit Gayer & Oz Shy, Publishers, Artists, and Copyright Enforcement, 18 INF.
ECON. & POL'Y 374, 382 (2006); William R. Johnson, Creative Pricing in Markets for Intel-
lectual Property, 2 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 5, 7-8 (2005); N. CURIEN ET
AL., CONSERVATOIRE NATIONAL DES ARTS ET METIERS, TOWARDS A NEW BUSINESS MODEL
FOR THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: ACCOMMODATING PIRACY THROUGH ANCILLARY PRODUCTS 1, 4-
5 (2004), http://www.cnam-econometrie.com/upload/curien-et-al(1).pdf.
75. See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Bits, Bands, and Books, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2008, at
A21.
76. Jeff Leeds, The New Deal: Band as Brand, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, § 2, at 1.
77. See, e.g., Job Cuts Sounded at Warner Music, BBC NEWS, May 8, 2007, http://ne
ws.bbc.co.uk/2lhilbusiness/6635813.stm.
78. Posting by Peter Kafka to Silicon Alley Insider, http://www.alleyinsider.com2007/
11/livewarnermusic_wmg.q4_call.html (Nov. 29, 2007, 08:29 EST) (summarizing
Bronfman's 2007 Q4 earnings call).
79. See Leeds, supra note 76.
80. Leeds, supra note 76.
81. Id.
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their work forces shrinking amid industry-wide cost cutting, will
deliver on their promises of patience."82 To date, the market's
judgment of the Live Nation deal has been even harsher, as Live
Nation's stock price began a plunge upon announcement of the
Madonna deal, losing about 34 percent of its value over the course
of seven weeks.S3
Despite these doubts, there is every reason to take the live-
performance-based model seriously. It may not wholly replace the
current copyright-centered model of supporting the production of
live music, but it has gained popularity among commentators
and, most important, has been at least partly embraced by the
industry.
D. Copyright Law and the Live-Performance-Based Model
Although the live performance model may be getting serious
consideration in discussions regarding the future of the recording
industry, one might rightly ask what its significance is to copy-
right law. Copyright owners have always been free to let others
copy or otherwise freely enjoy their work, and they often do so.S4
The live performance model could be seen as yet another varia-
tion on models such as broadcast television or radio, where free
content for the public drives revenue from other sources such as
advertising. There are three reasons why analyzing the live per-
formance model is significant to copyright law and policy.
First, many have come to challenge both the value and viability
of copyright as an institution. Those most skeptical of copyright
often invoke the live performance model as a way to assuage any
concerns as to any ill effects of abandoning copyright.8 5 Others
82. Id.
83. See Smith, supra note 34. In a report tinged with schadenfreude, music industry
insider blog Idolator reported that finances were so tight at Live Nation in late 2007 that
employees were asked to bring their own drinks and food to staff holiday parties. Idolator,
http://idolator.com/tunes/holidays-r.hell/live-nation-to-employees-please-help-us-stock-our-
bar-for-the-holidays-327494.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2008).
84. See Mark F. Schultz, Copynorms: Copyright Law and Social Norms, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 201, 211 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
85. For example, Yochai Benkler condemns the campaign to combat unauthorized file
sharing as something that ought to fail. Benkler, supra note 73, at 353. Benkler suggests
abandoning the "twentieth-century business model of industrial cultural production." Id.
In its place, he proposes to explore other ways of supporting musicians "from government
funding to tip jars and performances." Id. (citations omitted).
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are perhaps not so sanguine (for example, David Bowie's warning
that copyright "will no longer exist in 10 years"8 6), but see touring
as the only viable replacement. Although these normative and de-
scriptive views of copyright may be on the far end of the spec-
trum, they are hardly off the spectrum. Many in the academy are
skeptical as to the value of copyright just as many in the music
industry are skeptical of its viability. The value and viability of
the alternative embraced by many of these skeptics merits a tho-
rough examination.
Second, analyzing the potential effect of a move to exclusive re-
liance on live performance can yield insights about copyright's
role in fostering the creation and distribution of recorded music.
There almost certainly would be some kind of recorded music
business even without copyright protection, but the content of
that business would likely be quite different. Considering what
might be lost or gained, and what would remain the same, high-
lights copyright's role in the recording business.
Third, the existence and health of the live performance market
has been invoked to justify doctrinal and policy positions in copy-
right law. Most notably, it was cited by Justice Breyer to justify
his position regarding the Sony safe harbor in MGM v. Grok-
ster.87 In dueling concurrences in Grokster, Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Breyer debated the future application of the Sony safe
harbor.88 Justice Breyer contended that Justice Ginsburg was
seeking to modify the rule in Sony by narrowing it.89 Justice
Breyer asserted that the essential question was: "Will an unmodi-
fied Sony lead to a significant diminution in the amount or quali-
ty of creative work produced? Since copyright's basic objective is
creation and its revenue objectives but a means to that end, this
is the underlying copyright question."90
Justice Breyer concluded that there was insufficient evidence
of harm to the production of music to justify modifying Sony: "The
extent to which related production has actually and resultingly
declined remains uncertain, though there is good reason to be-
86. See Pareles, supra note 1.
87. 545 U.S. 913, 961-62 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 949 (Breyer, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 959 (Breyer, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 961.
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lieve that the decline, if any, is not substantial."91 In support of
this conclusion, Justice Breyer quotes Yochai Benkler's conten-
tion that live performance has not been harmed by file sharing:
'Much of the actual flow of revenue to artists-from performances
and other sources-is stable even assuming a complete displacement
of the CD market by peer-to-peer distribution ... [I]t would be silly
to think that music, a cultural form without which no human society
has existed, will cease to be in our world [because of illegal file
swapping] ."92
Thus, the live performance business model has entered the doc-
trinal debate regarding secondary liability for copyright infringe-
ment.
One problem with citing the health of the live performance
business to support a particular rule regarding liability for unau-
thorized copying of recorded music is that the live performance
business is not the same as the recorded music business. There
are some empirical and normative assumptions packed into
Benkler's statement quoted by Breyer that deserve further ex-
amination. The health of the live performance business does not
necessarily signal that the "the amount or quality of creative
work produced" remains the same. 93 The fact that musicians are
getting paid to play music does not ensure that they are creating
new music or, if they are, that such music is being preserved in
the form of recordings.
III. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ALTERNATE MODELS FOR
FINANCING THE PRODUCTION OF CREATIVE WORKS
Although most producers of copyrighted works make money by
selling their works directly to consumers, direct sales have never
been the only way to make money from copyrighted works. Even
as examples of direct sales abound including movie tickets, CDs,
DVDs, and books other, less direct business models are equally
familiar. For example, neither the producers of broadcast televi-
sion programs, nor the broadcast networks that show those pro-
grams, charge consumers to view their work.94 Instead, broadcas-
91. Id. at 962.
92. Id. at 962 (quoting Benkler, supra note 73, at 351-52).
93. Id. at 961.
94. This does not include cable and satellite operators who do charge customers for
access and pass on some of those revenues in the form of licensing fees.
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ters make money by selling advertising and, in turn, purchase
shows from producers that they hope will generate an audience.95
The proposed live performance business model for financing
the creation of popular music recordings is thus a variation on a
familiar business model in the creative industries. In such mod-
els, the audience that enjoys a creative work does not pay for the
work directly; rather, its attention or interest is leveraged by the
creator or a third party to create value elsewhere. The producer
thus derives economic value indirectly from its audience's de-
mand for copying, performing, sharing, or using the work.
A large body of literature on the economics of copyright and in-
formation goods has come to recognize the potential benefits of al-
ternatives to direct sales. Since landmark economic papers in the
1980s by Stan Liebowitz, and by Stanley Besen and Sheila Kirby,
showed that unauthorized copying or other use can actually bene-
fit the producer of content, theoretical models extending the idea
have proliferated.96 More generally, business writers and other
popular commentators have become enamored with the "free"
business models of Google and other successful online business-
es.97 Authors like Chris Anderson, author of the forthcoming
Free! Why $0. 00 Is the Future of Business98 have followed this in-
sight to its logical conclusion.
Nevertheless, some restraint is warranted before discarding
business models based on charging consumers directly for copy-
righted works. Liebowitz, whose 1985 paper launched the litera-
ture, recently commented that "[tihe current literature on this
subject ... seems to be badly out of kilter," as it has gone too far
95. See Meg James, Prime Time Can Still Sell Ads, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 2008, at Cl;
Brian Stelter, TV Stations Seek Shows To Post Online, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, at C7
("As Oprah Winfrey and Alex Trebek can attest, syndication is a backbone of local broad-
casting: affiliates purchase the local rights to specific shows and sell ads alongside the con-
tent.").
96. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen & Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Private Copying, Appropriabil-
ity, and Optimal Copying Royalties, 32 J.L. & ECON. 255, 280 (1989); S.J. Liebowitz, Copy-
ing and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals, 93 J. POL. ECON. 945, 947-48
(1985) [hereinafter Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect Appropriability].
97. See Chris Anderson, Free! Why $0.00 Is the Future of Business, WIRED, Feb. 25,
2008, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/16-03/fffree [hereinafter Anderson,
Free.]; see also Matt Asay, Lessons from Google and Red Hat for Facebook and Open
Source, THE OPEN ROAD, Nov. 18, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13505_3-9819669-16.
html.
98. Anderson, Free!, supra note 97. Anderson's book is due to be published by Hyper-
ion in 2009. Id.
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in embracing the benefits of unauthorized copying. 99 Although
there is more than one way to extract revenue from the interest of
one's audience, charging them directly remains the most common
way to do so in most creative endeavors.100 Thus, copying and
sharing often do result in losses to the extent they substitute for
direct sales.
Alternative, indirect models for selling content prosper only
under certain specific conditions. The following discussion first
considers lessons from the economic literature on the benefits and
limits of indirect appropriation business models. It then further
examines a few real life examples to gain a better understanding
of how content creators make such models work in the actual
marketplace.
A. The Potential Benefits of Alternative Business Models
The literature on the economics of copyright has shown that
foregoing at least some direct sales to consumers can benefit con-
tent producers under some circumstances.1 0 1 In some instances,
producers at least have been able to replace revenues otherwise
lost to unauthorized copying or usage. Models suggest that pro-
ducers' profits might even increase with unauthorized copying
and usage because of one or more beneficial effects.102 This sub-
section examines these potential benefits before turning to impor-
tant limitations on the applicability of these models.
99. Stan Liebowitz, Economists' Topsy-Turvy View of Piracy, 2 REV. ECON. RESEARCH
COPYRIGHT ISSUES 5, 5 (2005) [hereinafter Liebowitz, Economists' Topsy-Turvy View]. He
observes that "[t]heoretical models now abound in the literature 'demonstrating' all the
ways that the producer of a product might benefit from piracy. Economic articles on this
subject would seem to imply that it is almost always a terrific strategy to have third par-
ties providing free copies of your product. And these articles generally conclude that socie-
ty would almost always be better off in such a situation." Id.
100. Most examinations of indirect appropriation begin with an acknowledgement that
direct appropriation remains common and that copying does deprive creators of sales in
many cases. See, e.g., Besen & Kirby, supra note 96, at 257.
101. See id. at 264-67.
102. The discussion in this section leaves aside consideration of total welfare effects
and focuses on producer revenues. See infra Parts V.A & V.C.2 for a discussion of consum-
er welfare.
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1. Indirect Appropriation
In some instances, producers can indirectly appropriate the
value created by consumer copying if they can increase the price
they charge for the originals.103 Indirect appropriation was first
observed in a study of the effect of photocopying on print publish-
ers. 104 Liebowitz argued that photocopying would not harm a
publisher if it increased demand for the original publication.105
Liebowitz found this apparently to be true in the case of libraries:
A library's willingness to pay for journals should increase when pho-
tocopying is done on the premises because the availability of photo-
copying causes a library's users to value the library's journal hold-
ings more highly and library funding is (almost certainly) related in
some manner to the tastes and values of library users. 10 6
Liebowitz tested this proposition by reviewing subscription
price data in 1959 and 1982.107 Publishers appeared to engage in
indirect appropriation by charging more to libraries (where shar-
ing and copying occurs) than to individuals.108 This price discrim-
ination increased with the advent of photocopying.10 9 Moreover,
demand increased for materials that were more easily copied-
journals-and declined for materials less easily copied-books.110
Besen and Kirby extended Liebowitz's insights with a formal
model.111
Other real-life examples of indirect appropriation of the value
of copies appear to be rare. Liebowitz plausibly proposed that the
price of CDs likely accounted for the value of a cassette copies
that the purchaser made for personal use. 112 The same could like-
ly be said for CDs and the ability to copy the file onto an MP3
player. The ability to copy the original and use it in other settings
would make it more valuable to the purchaser and thus increase
willingness to pay. For reasons discussed below, however, it is
103. Besen & Kirby, supra note 96, at 264-67.
104. Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect Appropriability, supra note 96, at 950-55.
105. Id. at 955-56.
106. Id. at 949.
107. Id. at 950.
108. Id. at 949-50.
109. Id. at 953.
110. See id. at 949.
111. See Besen & Kirby, supra note 96, at 264-72.
112. Liebowitz, Economists' Topsy-Turvy View, supra note 99, at 8.
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generally difficult to capture the value of copying recordings by
charging more for the original-and likely increasingly so, as dig-
ital technology and networked communications enable a vast
flood of copies from a single original. Nevertheless, the early work
by Liebowitz and others spawned a substantial body of literature
on ways in which producers might benefit from or mitigate the ef-
fects of copying or shared use of copyrighted works.
2. Sharing of Information Goods
The insights regarding the potential benefits of using indirect
appropriation to capture the value of copying have been extended
to the sharing of information goods among groups of consum-
ers.11 3 Just as in the case of journal copying, the ability to share
may make the work more valuable to the purchaser. The produc-
er may thus be able to charge a price that accounts for the value
of all those sharing.114 In some cases, sharing may actually be
more profitable than direct sales to individuals.11 5
Examples of groups sharing copyrighted works are quite com-
mon. Some are small groups, including families subscribing to ca-
ble television, 116 parents reading books to children, 117 and friends
sharing a performance of a DVD or recorded music.11S In each of
these examples, the good or service becomes more valuable to the
consumer making the purchase because she can share it with
family and friends.119
Sometimes the group doing the sharing is a customer base or
audience. Thus, video store customers share DVDs through ren-
tals, and public library patrons share books through borrow-
ing.120
113. Yannis Bakos et al., Shared Information Goods, 42 J.L. & ECON. 117, 119, 126
(1999); Michael J. Meurer, Too Many Markets or Too Few? Copyright Policy Toward
Shared Works, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 913-15 (2004); Hal R. Varian, Buying, Sharing, and
Renting Information Goods, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 473, 473, 483, 485-86 (2000).
114. Bakos et al., supra note 113, at 122, 141-43, 148.
115. See id. at 141-43.
116. Id. at 121.
117. Meurer, supra note 113, at 905.
118. Bakos et al., supra note 113, at 121.
119. Meurer, supra note 113, at 923.
120. Bakos et al., supra note 113, at 120-21; Meurer supra note 113, at 913.
20091
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Sharing models based on advertising revenue are very com-
mon. As noted earlier, broadcast television is one example of such
a model. Broadcast radio is another, as songwriters license songs
to radio stations which sell ads based on the size of their au-
dience.12 1 The producers of some internet content such as stock
tickers, newswire articles, etc., license their work to websites,
which are also in the ad business. In some instances, a producer
shares its own content with an audience in order to generate ad
revenue. Television networks do this with the portion of their
programming that they self-produce (for example, news and some
programs) as do web services like MSN and Yahoo!, free newspa-
pers, and daily newspapers and magazines that give their content
away for free online.
3. Bundled and Complementary Goods
Firms may mitigate the effects of unauthorized copying by
bundling a copyable work or other information good with a non-
copyable product or service. 122 For example, software firms often
provide customer support or updates and upgrades only to cus-
tomers who possess the authorized version of the work. Because
many users find these bundled elements to be essential, they are
less likely to find a copied version acceptable. In instances where
use of the product requires access to an online resource, it simply
may be rendered useless without the bundled service. 123
121. Meurer describes radio as an example of a successful sharing model. See Meurer,
supra note 113, at 925-26. Some of the literature on the sharing of information goods dis-
regards mass-market models like broadcast radio or television, but broadcast radio or tel-
evision fit the general model very well. See, e.g., Bakos et al. supra note 113, at 122 (ar-
guing that market-based models do not allow for diversity of consumer transactions). In
fact, radio and television would seem to be among the most commercially successful exam-
ples of sharing.
122. See Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, Privacy of Digital Products: A Critical
Review of the Theoretical Literature 1 (Int'l Sch. of Bus. in F.R.G., Working Paper Group
Paper No. 42/2006, 2006), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=466063 [hereinafter Peitz
& Waelbroeck, Piracy of Digital Products]. In the economics of copyright literature, this
strategy is also often thought of as a product differentiation strategy that makes the origi-
nals more valuable than copies. See, e.g., id. at 4 (concluding the availability of a pirated
good either reduces the creator's profits or leaves them unchanged). While updates and
upgrades are likely to be just as vulnerable to copying as the original, they come so fre-
quently for some modern software products that copying would become impracticable for
many consumers.
123. For example, the TiVo digital video recorder's software checks in with an online
service and downloads a current television guide.
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Bundling is more of a way to protect revenues from copying ra-
ther than to replace revenues lost to copying. However, some sug-
gest that products that are sufficiently differentiated in quality
from freely available copies via bundling may actually benefit
from the existence of those copies. If the value of the product in-
creases to consumers because of the sampling or network effects
described above, their willingness to pay for the higher quality,
bundled version may increase. 124
Similarly, a producer of digital works that are freely available,
either by design or default, may capture some of the value of free
copies by selling complementary products or services separately.
This model is employed by businesses in the open source software
industry, such as Red Hat, a publicly held company that distri-
butes its own version of Linux, the open source operating sys-
tem.1 25 Since Red Hat's version of Linux is published under the
GNU General Public License,126 others are free to copy and dis-
tribute it.127 Red Hat makes its money by selling complementary
services: subscriptions to upgrades and unlimited support for its
version of Linux.128
4. Effects that May Cause Free Availability To Increase Profits
The models described thus far-indirect appropriation, shar-
ing, bundling, and complementary sales-may do more than
simply replace direct sales. A number of models suggest that the
free availability of copyright works could generate effects that in-
crease profitability. The three that are arguably most relevant to
124. See Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, Why the Music Industry May Gain from
Free Downloading-The Role of Sampling, 24 INVIL J. INDUS. ORG. 907, 910 n.6 (2005),
available at http://ssrm.com/abstracts=829544 [hereinafter Peitz & Waelbroeck, The Role
of Sampling].
125. See David K. Levine & Michele Boldrin, Market Structure and Property Rights in
Open Source Industries 6-8 (UCLA Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 122247000000*00
2269), available at http://www.dklevine.con/papers/os-wustl-lawreview.pdf (describing
Red Hat's business model).
126. See id.
127. See GNU Operating System, Various Licenses and Comments About Them,
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy license-list.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2008) for a descrip-
tion of various open source licenses and how they work.
128. See Red Hat, Why Subscriptions, http://www.redhat.com/about/whysubscriptions/?
intcmp=70160000000HX03 (last visited Dec. 20, 2008).
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this article are reducing transaction costs, sampling, and network
effects. 129
Copying or sharing may increase profits by reducing transac-
tions costs. In the case of tangible goods, an intermediary like a
library, rental store, or group may have a much more efficient
way to share or provide copies to consumers. 130 With respect to
digital goods, the savings may be less because the marginal pro-
duction costs of digital goods are negligibly small. 131 Neverthe-
less, marketing and distribution costs still ought to be accounted
for as customers need to be persuaded to buy the goods and the
purchase likely involves some payment processing costs. 132 Pri-
vate copying done within the context of a group or as part of a
bundle may avoid those transaction costs. 133
Demand for originals may also increase if consumers have an
opportunity to sample some works via copying or sharing. Many
information goods, particularly.music, movies, and books, are ex-
perience goods-goods in which product characteristics are diffi-
cult to ascertain before consumption.134 Freely available copies
can allow people to satisfy their tastes better and, as Peitz and
129. This list leaves off at least two other potentially positive effects discussed in the
literature: demand "smoothing" (the aggregation effect) and the opportunity to engage in
price discrimination. See Meurer, supra note 113, at 916 for a useful discussion of the var-
ious potential negative and positive effects on profits from information sharing. Demand
smoothing or aggregation is the topic of considerable discussion in the literature. See, e.g.,
Bakos et al., supra note 113, at 123-26; Meurer, supra note 113, at 916. Selling a product
to a group that shares or copies it can increase profits by aggregating the demand of the
users and "smoothing" the dispersion of demand. See Bakos et al., supra note 113, at 123-
26 (discussing and modeling this phenomenon). The price discrimination effect is less
technical. The aggregation of users into different groups that are sharing or copying may
enable price discrimination. For example, movie studios are able to price discriminate be-
tween high and low value users by selling DVDs at a higher price to individuals who value
them most and by renting to those who value them less. See Varian, supra note 113, at
486-87 (noting this discrimination is enabled by the movie studios engaging in revenue
sharing with chain rental stores). As Meurer describes, the American Society of Compos-
ers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP"), along with other collecting societies, are able to
engage in perfect price discrimination among radio stations, as they use ratings that show
the size of the customer base to determine prices. See Meurer, supra note 113, at 925-26.
130. See Meurer, supra note 113, at 916-17 ("Sellers benefit directly by avoiding pro-
duction and distribution costs on each foregone sale."); Varian, supra note 113, at 477
(finding, in the case of academic journals, "[ilf there are economies of scale in storage and
retrieval, libraries would be more cost effective than individuals").
131. See Peitz & Waelbroeck, Piracy of Digital Products, supra note 122, at 17.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See generally Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL.
ECON. 311 (1970) (originating the concept of experience goods).
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Waelbroeck show, this greater satisfaction could lead to greater
willingness to pay for originals-provided the originals are some-
how superior to the copies sampled.135 Sampling also works if the
freely available good is similar to, but not the same as, goods that
are not freely available.136 For example, a consumer might pur-
chase a musician's CDs after downloading a few sample songs the
musician makes available.
Finally, network effects from copying might increase demand
for originals. The most commonly discussed example of this effect
is in the software industry.137 The need for interoperability
makes certain software programs more valuable to users as the
overall user base increases, whether through purchasing or unau-
thorized copying. Thus, a spreadsheet program is more valuable if
many others use it, as it becomes easier to exchange files and da-
ta.
Some have theorized that file sharing may produce network ef-
fects for music. 138 The difficulty with this assertion is that these
analyses often seem to confuse sampling effects with network ef-
fects. Sampling may help people find music they like, and wide-
spread availability may make it easier to engage in sampling.
However, network effects only occur if an increase in the number
of people enjoying music makes music more valuable to consum-
ers. 139
B. The Limits of Alternative Business Models
Despite the large volume of academic literature and popular
enthusiasm regarding the potential financial benefits of allowing
consumers to copy or share copyrighted works, such models only
work well in certain limited circumstances. This discussion con-
135. See Peitz & Waelbroeck, The Role of Sampling, supra note 124, at 908.
136. See id.
137. See, e.g., Kathleen R. Conner & Richard P. Rumelt, Software Piracy: An Analysis
of Protection Strategies, 37 MGMT. SCI. 125, 125 (1991); Oz Shy & Jacques F. Thisse, A
Strategic Approach to Software Protection, 8 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY, 163, 163 (1999);
Lisa N. Takeyama, The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual
Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities, 42 J. INDUS. ECON. 155, 155-56
(1994).
138. See, e.g., Amit Gayer & Oz Shy, Copyright Enforcement in the Digital Era, in
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 229, 233-34, 236-38 (Gerhard I1-
ling & Martin Peite eds., 2006).
139. See Liebowitz, Economists' Topsy-Turvy View, supra note 99, at 15.
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siders those limitations that are most relevant to the discussion
of the concert-based model for financing the recording industry.
Two requirements can be generalized from the earlier discus-
sion about the potential benefits of copying- or sharing-based
models. To the extent either of these conditions is not met, copy-
ing or sharing will undermine the viability of any business model
based on free availability. First, there is a "linkage require-
ment"- free availability must be strongly and positively linked to
demand either for the original or for another good or service that
produces revenue for the creator. Second, there is a "revenue re-
quirement"-the revenue-producing part of the model must be
sufficiently remunerative to make up for the tolerance (whether
explicit or implicit) of copying or sharing.
1. Linkage
To satisfy the linkage requirement, one would need to craft a
business arrangement that forges a link as strong as those de-
scribed earlier. One might engage in indirect appropriation by
charging a purchaser a price that accounts for the copies made
from it. As Liebowitz observes, however, "the value received by
the individual using the unauthorized copy must be registered, at
least to some extent, with the individual providing the authorized
copy from which the unauthorized copy is made. This is an abso-
lutely necessary precondition for indirect appropriability."140 The
purchaser is unlikely to pay more for an original out of pure al-
truism just because others can copy it. Instead, the copying must
increase the value to the original purchaser, as patron copying
did for libraries in the example examined by Liebowitz. 141
Business models based on sharing face a similar constraint-
the ability to share the work must increase its value. This condi-
tion is most readily met in mass market circumstances where an
intermediary obtains revenue from allowing consumers to share
the good. Thus, radio stations are willing to pay blanket licensing
fees to ASCAP, Broadvast Music, Inc. ("BMI"), or SESAC because
they can sell advertising based on the size of the audience "shar-
ing" or listening to the music. 142 Video rental chains similarly
140. Id. at 9.
141. See Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect Appropriability, supra note 96, at 949.
142. See Meurer, supra note 113, at 925.
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were willing to pay relatively high prices for VHS tapes and
DVDs because they were able to capture the value obtained from
"sharing" (in other words, renting) their DVDs with customers. 143
If a business model is based on selling complementary goods or
services, then the goods or services being sold must indeed be
complements with the freely available goods. Classic examples of
complementary goods that illustrate the necessary strength of the
linkage are hot dogs and buns and left and right shoes-goods
that are typically or almost always consumed together. Thus, the
cross elasticity of demand for the good must be negative-sales of
the revenue-producing good or service should be driven by con-
sumption of the free good. Red Hat's Linux services were an ex-
ample given earlier that will be explored in depth later.
Apple, Inc., is another example of a company that has greatly
benefitted from exploiting a complementary relationship. In this
case, it is the complementarity between digital music files and
digital music players. Music players like the iPod are generally
the most convenient way to listen to digital music; Apple has sold
vast numbers of iPods as consumers accumulate digital music
files by both legitimate and illegitimate means. 144 At the same
time, increasing sales of iPods increase digital music sales. Apple
CEO Steve Jobs was prescient in foreseeing this link. He thus
persuaded the major labels to provide his iTunes store with then
unprecedented access to their catalogs, which has allowed Apple
to benefit from both sides of the complementary relationship.14 5
Bundling also can produce a strong link between a freely avail-
able good and a revenue producing good or service. In the case of
goods that are easy to copy, however, the key to success is to en-
sure that the customer must purchase the copyable good as part
of a bundle to also obtain something highly desirable or necessary
that cannot be copied. For example, software companies bundle
their products with services and upgrades by employing unique
serial numbers and online verification of legitimacy.
143. See Varian, supra note 113, at 478. In the last decade, this older model of initial
high prices has been largely superseded by a newer model where movie studios share rev-
enue with national rental chains in exchange for lower prices. See id. at 487.
144. Press Release, Apple, 100 Million iPods Sold (April 9, 2007), available at http://
www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/09ipod.html.
145. See Jeff Goodell, Steve Jobs: The Rolling Stone Interview, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 25,
2003, at 31, 32.
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Even if a strong link is created between a freely available good
and a revenue-producing good or service, that link is often based
on the fact that copying or sharing is linked to a specific original
and limited to a specific group of identifiable consumers. 146 These
conditions were met in the library example, as physical copying is
limited to a particular location and tends to be done by one patron
at a time, going back to the original.147 Similarly, until several
years ago, access to shared goods like broadcast television was
limited, and consumers were exposed to commercials fairly regu-
larly.148
Once the market is flooded with copies and copies are substi-
tutable for originals, the link breaks down.149 Digitization and
file sharing have opened the floodgates. It has become increasing-
ly difficult to charge extra for an "original" when perfect substi-
tutes are available everywhere. Thus, television studios and
broadcast networks are rushing to meet the challenge of digital
copying of television shows to their business models.150 If con-
sumers can easily obtain high quality of copies of television
shows, sans commercials, on the Internet, then the advertising-
based model breaks down.
Similarly, sampling effects are undermined by copies that are
substitutable for the original. Many sampling models have ar-
gued that file sharing can promote the purchase of originals. For
example, Peitz and Waelbroeck assume that MP3 files are not
perfect substitutes for originals because consumers derive an ex-
tra benefit from "lyrics, booklet, pictures, song information, [and]
feel-good factor to have indirectly paid the artist."151 Increasing-
146. Many of the theoretical models that show sharing to be profitable depend very ex-
plicitly on limited access and copying. For example, Bakos, Brynjolfsson, and Lichtman
state the assumption that "social norms, a legal rule, or a product packaging decision
cause the relevant sharing to occur among friends and family members, and not as part of
an efficient market for secondhand goods." Bakos et al., supra note 113, at 146-47.
147. See Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect Appropriability, supra note 96, at 949.
148. Digital video recorders, file sharing, commercial sales websites like iTunes and
Amazon, and streaming from network-affiliated websites have eroded this limitation. Vid-
eo tape recorders also eroded value a bit, but not as much, due to differences in conveni-
ence and quality.
149. Justin P. Johnson & Michael Waldman, The Limits of Indirect Appropriability in
Markets for Copyable Goods, 2 REV. ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT ISSUES, 19, 20 (2005).
150. The Hulu online streaming service backed by NBC and News Corp. (Fox) is a
prime example of the new efforts. Hulu, Media Info, http://www.hulu.com/about (last vi-
sited Dec. 20, 2008).
151. Peitz & Waelbroeck, The Role of Sampling, supra note 124, at 909 n.5.
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ly, these items seem less of a point of differentiation, as consum-
ers become accustomed to buying music from online music stores.
In addition, cover art and lyrics are widely available online.
Finally, sometimes the link between free availability and in-
creased revenues is temporary and should not be mistaken as a
sustainable business model for a product, career, or entire indus-
try.152 For example, an unknown musician might benefit from
sampling via file sharing, becoming well-known enough to
achieve some sales. This success likely represents an increase in
sales relative to the rest of the music industry rather than an in-
crease in sales for the industry overall. 153 It would be like free
samples encouraging sales of a new brand of cola-sales likely
would come from Coke and Pepsi rather than a growth in the
overall market.
Trendiness or herd behavior can also be seen as producing a
network effect, but this effect is also most likely to be merely rela-
tive. 154 Even if a particular piece of music or artist benefits from
trendiness, the effect likely just shifts demand within the market
for music rather than creating a larger market for music. In the
next week or month, demand may shift to yet another trendy art-
ist without increasing overall demand.
2. Revenue Requirement
Even if copying or sharing has some positive effect on sales of a
revenue-producing linked good or service, the effect will not nec-
essarily be enough to have a positive impact. As Hal Varian ob-
serves, "The impact of sharing on profits depends on how the val-
ue of the shared good increases as compared to how the number
of copies sold decreases. If the first effect outweighs the second,
profits will increase, otherwise they will decrease."155
The net effect of free availability must be sufficiently positive to
sustain incentives to create the good being copied or shared. This
condition is implicit but not really previously discussed in the lit-
152. Liebowitz, Economists' Topsy-Turvy View, supra note 99, at 8.
153. The net effect depends on whether consumers simply shift consumption among
acts, or whether consumers derive sufficiently greater satisfaction from their new discov-
ery that they increase their consumption of music overall.
154. Liebowitz, Economists' Topsy-Turvy View, supra note 99, at 7-8.
155. Varian, supra note 113, at 478.
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erature. It is particularly relevant here because of the many chal-
lenges that the concert business imposes.
The net effect on revenue is a function of two things: the mag-
nitude of the positive effect and the characteristics of the reve-
nue-producing good or service. In particular, if the copied or
shared good becomes completely free, as some say will happen
with recorded music, the market for the revenue-producing good
must support the cost of the free good.
In the case where a producer must give away the copyable
good, then it must be able to charge a price that covers its com-
bined costs for both the free good and the revenue-producing good
or service. Even if one adopts the common assumption of zero
marginal costs for the production of the creative work,Z56 there
are still fixed costs of production to be covered as well as opportu-
nity costs. It may be difficult to cover these costs if the market for
the revenue producing good is relatively small or if demand is
elastic.
C. Examples of and Lessons from Indirect Appropriation
Business Models
To the extent that any concert-based model for financing re-
cordings works, it is likely to rely on some version of complemen-
tary goods or bundling. It is thus worthwhile to examine success-
ful examples of such models in greater depth to see what makes
them work. The following discussion looks at two such examples.
The first is Red Hat Enterprise Linux, where the link between
the freely available good-an open source operating system-and
revenue-providing services is the result of inherent complemen-
tarities. The second is an online virtual world for children known
as Webkinz, where the "free" online game is bundled with a reve-
nue-producing toy and the link is the product of design and clever
marketing.
Just as some propose that popular musicians give away their
recordings, Red Hat allows competitors and consumers to copy
156. This assumption is useful for modeling but may be too optimistic for real-world
business planning. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text. For example, high ad-
vertising and customer acquisition and retention costs characterize many online business-
es. In a world flooded with information and choices, it is hard to get and keep the attention
of consumers.
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freely the source code for the customized version of Linux that it
has developed. 157 Red Hat Enterprise Linux is released under a
license that allows customers and competitors to copy the source
code provided they remove trademarks and change server
links.158 Significant copying does occur, even by as formidable a
competitor as Oracle, Inc., which very noisily announced in 2006
that it was copying Red Hat's software to create its own version of
Linux. 159 Red Hat's business model embraces such copying de-
spite the fact that Red Hat invests significant resources in contri-
buting to the Linux development community and in developing
and testing its own version.160
Despite, or arguably because of, the free availability of its soft-
ware, Red Hat is still able to capture a great deal of value from its
version of Linux. First of all, its investment in building its version
of Linux and in participating in the Linux community does not go
to waste, as it has helped develop and establish Red Hat's exper-
tise. 161 Businesses that depend on Linux for important functions
are willing to pay Red Hat for its expertise and support.162 No
wonder some companies rely on Red Hat for mission critical ap-
plications. As of this writing, the Red Hat website touts its rela-
tionship with the automated travel reservation service, Sabre
Holdings, Inc. 163 Sabre's information technology infrastructure
157. Red Hat Enterprise Linux is released under the General Public License (GPL) but
cannot be copied and redistributed commercially unless the copier first removes the "RED
HAT' trademarks. See Appendix 2: License Agreement and Limited Product Warranty
Red Hat® Enterprise Linux® and Red Hat Applications, http://www.redhat.com/licenses/
rhel us_3.html? (last visited Dec. 20, 2008) ("If Client makes a commercial redis- tribution
of RHDS, unless a separate agreement with Red Hat is executed or other permission
granted, then Client must modify any files identified as "REDHAT-LOGOS" and "anacon-
da-images" to remove all images containing the "Red Hat" trademark or the "Shadowman"
logo. Merely deleting these files may corrupt RHDS."). In other words, Red Hat simulta-
neously leverages and protects its brand by integrating its trademarks into its products.
This strategy is a clever form of product differentiation that arguably makes the original
more valuable and slightly increases the cost of copying.
158. See id.
159. Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Oracle Adopts Red Hat Linux as Its Own, LINUX-
WATCH, Oct. 25, 2006, http://www.linux-watch.com/news/NS7266264422.html.
160. Levine & Boldrin, supra note 125, at 6 (noting that Red Hat employs some of the
main developers, contributes to community projects, and otherwise expends resources).
161. See, e.g., id.
162. See, e.g., Red Hat, Red Hat Delivers Unmatched Performance and Reduced Costs
for Sabre Holdings, Travelocity, http://www.redhat.comlf/pdfblog/RH-SabreHoldings-CS-
734891_ 0808 cw web.pdf.
163. See id.
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handles 32,000 transactions per second and requires 100 percent
uptime. 164
The importance of Red Hat's software to businesses ensures
that Red Hat's services are a strong complement to its freely
available software. For a company like Sabre, Red Hat's support
and reputation are absolutely essential. 165 A chief information of-
ficer for a company with such intensive needs must be able to jus-
tify technology selection decisions to her employers, who in turn
have to account to shareholders. In such circumstances, the
availability of reliable support from a company with an estab-
lished reputation greatly increases a customer's willingness to
use the software. The "cost-free" nature of the software is likely
almost irrelevant.
Turning to a very different story, a successful product bundle
consisting of an online game for kids and a stuffed animal illu-
strate some other features that likely would be relevant to any
concert-based model for financing recordings. This business is a
children's product known as Webkinz, which combines an online
game with plush toys. 166 Webkinz provides a useful case study
regarding how to build a successful model that gives away an in-
formation good as part of a product bundle.
In the case of Webkinz, the "free" creative work is an immense-
ly popular virtual world game known as Webkinz World, which is
aimed at children ages six to thirteen.167 The game is produced
by the Ganz toy company and provided free of charge-with some
strings attached. Although there are no subscription fees per se,
the user must purchase a Webkinz plush toy, which comes with a
unique code that establishes a Webkinz account good for a
year.1 68 The primary function of the "free" Webkinz World game
is to drive sales of Webkinz stuffed animals while creating loyalty
and enthusiasm for the brand. 169
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. See Webkinz Home Page, http://www.webkinz.comlus-en/ (last visited Dec. 20,
2008).
167. See Webkinz, For Parents, http://www.webkinz.comus-en/faq-parents.html (last
visited Dec. 20, 2008).
168. See Webkinz, General Questions, http://www.webkinz.com/us-en/faq-general.html
(last visited Dec. 20, 2008). The game is marketed as a "free" additional benefit. See id.
169. Because marketing to children is a matter of some delicacy and Ganz is privately
held, it never puts things so bluntly. However, its application for a business method patent
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The game is a fairly substantial undertaking, as it currently
draws nearly 12 million unique visitors a month170 and is con-
stantly updated with new material. Users establish a persistent
virtual home, care for virtual pets, play games, earn currency
that they can use to furnish their virtual homes ("Kinz Cash"),
and engage in limited social networking.17 1 Unlike other virtual
worlds, however, the creator does not directly appropriate value
from the game by charging monthly fees. 172 Rather, players are
subtly encouraged or manipulated, within the bounds of what
parents and children's watchdog groups will tolerate, to buy more
Webkinz toys or collateral merchandise like t-shirts.173
One reason the Webkinz business model works so well is that
the two products-the game and the toys-are closely tied, and
customers want each part of the package. One industry analyst
observed, "We've found most kids are actively playing both the
online version... and with the physical toy. If either one didn't
work on its own, I don't think the combination would be as magi-
cal." 174 The tie is also unavoidable. A customer must buy a Web-
kinz plush toy to receive access to the online game. In turn, the
game encourages customers to collect more Webkinz plush toys
with special notices about newly released "pets" and promotions,
bonuses related to ownership of particular pets, and a lump sum
payment of Kinz Cash that comes with each new pet "adopted."175
does so. See System and Method For Product Marketing Using Feature Codes, U.S. Patent
No. 20,080,163,055, 79 (filed Dec. 5, 2007) (issued July 3, 2008), available at http://app
ftl.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.html [hereinafter, '055 Patent] (enter "20,080,163,
055").
170. Jocelyn Christie, Kids Virtual World Scene Getting Quite Crowded, KIDSCREEN,
May 1, 2008, at 27.
171. See, '055 Patent supra note 169, at 113-14, 132, 141.
172. See Webkinz, For Parents, supra note 167.
173. See Julianna Parker, Webkinz Take over the Net, NORMAN TRANSCRIPT (Norman,
Okla.) Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.normantranscript.com/features/local-story-214002432 ("'I
don't know any kids who come in here and have just one or two,' said Roxanne Avery,
manager at J's Hallmark in Sooner Mall. 'They have a lot.... I even have kids who have
50. It is a craze."').
174. Abbey Klaassen, Entertainment Marketers of the Year: Howard Ganz, ADVER-
TISING AGE, May 19, 2008, at 810.
175. See, e.g., Webkinz, The Pet of the Month Program Details, http://www.webkinz.
comlus-en/bulletinz.potm.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2008), ('The Webkinz Pet of the
Month is an exciting monthly program in Webkinz World where a special plush pet is
spotlighted and celebrated with special gifts and special events all month."); '055 Patent,
supra note 169, at 136-37.
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The other factor that makes Webkinz work is that customers
are willing to pay a premium for the revenue-producing part of
the bundle, the plush toy. While ordinary plush toys of similar
quality and size could be had for under $5, Webkinz plush toys
typically retail for between $12 and $15.176 Ganz is a privately
held company, so it does not report sales figures, but one analyst
estimated sales of over $100 million in 2007.177 Retailers that
stock Webkinz plush toys report booming sales. The Limited Too
chain's sales have been boosted by stocking the toys, and its par-
ent company's stock price has gone up based on the strength of its
status as a Webkinz distributor.178
Red Hat and Webkinz both illustrate different ways of building
a successful alternative business model by "giving away" an in-
formation good. Any successful concert-revenue-based model for
financing recordings would need to have similar strengths.
In both cases, the free good is strongly linked to the revenue-
producing good or service. In the case of Red Hat, its corporate
users absolutely need the services that Red Hat provides, and
Red Hat's expertise and reputation ensure that it is the source of
the services that its customers seek out. In the case of Webkinz,
the link is created and made unavoidable through bundling and
technical security measures and is reinforced through clever
marketing.
In both cases, the revenue-producing part of the business is
substantial enough to support the production of the free good. In
the case of Red Hat, its costs of production for the free good are
reduced somewhat by the open-source nature of the program-
Redhat is building on something that was made freely available.
Moreover, the bet-the-company situations in which the product is
used increase the willingness of customers to pay. In the case of
Webkinz, it appears that there likely are substantial costs to
create and maintain the game, but the revenue-producing part of
the package is a low-cost plush toy. Moreover, the game rein-
forces loyalty and encourages demand for the product.
176. Prices are based on a review of Amazon.com during July 2008. See Amazon.com,
Webkinz, http://www.amazon.com/tag/webkinz (last visited Dec. 20, 2008).
177. Brian Hindo, Toys with a Second Life, BUS. WK., Dec. 31, 2007, at 91.
178. Jeffrey Sheban, Tween Brands Stock Rises on Webkinz News: Plush Toys Seen as
Profit Booster, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Columbus, Ohio) June 26, 2007, http://www.colum
busdispatch.conlive/contentfbusiness/stories/2007/06/26/webkinz.html.
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Successful examples like Red Hat and Webkinz show that
businesses can build successful models by profiting indirectly
from copyrighted works for which other businesses charge direct-
ly. Research on the economics of copyright explains why such
models can work. Both that research and the various real life ex-
amples discussed in this section, however, show the limits of
"free" business models. Costs and revenue cannot simply be
shifted from one business to another. Each business has its own
unique constraints, and the music business is no exception.
IV. SUPPORTING THE RECORDING BUSINESS WITH
REVENUES FROM LIVE PERFORMANCE
Shifting the primary means of financing recorded popular mu-
sic from the sale of recordings to indirect support from live per-
formance revenue would be more difficult than some may think.
Alternative business models based on exploiting the positive ef-
fects of widespread copying seem theoretically possible. But reali-
ty often proves far more difficult. As Liebowitz concluded in his
pioneering study on the positive effects of journal copying, "[o]nly
case-by-case empirical investigations of institutions and markets
can discover the impacts of [each] form[ ] of copying."179
This discusion considers the unique characteristics and chal-
lenges posed by live performance as a business and how they
would affect the ability of the concert business to support the re-
cording business. Live performance as an economic activity is
both aided and constrained by its uniqueness and its scarcity. On
the one hand, live performance seems to offer an opportunity.
While it seems to be getting more difficult to persuade people to
pay for recorded music, they really have no choice but to pay if
they want to experience a live performance. On the other hand,
the uniquely scarce and limited nature of live performance im-
poses some challenges as a business model in its own right, as
well as a way to support the recording business.
The following discussion considers each of the criteria dis-
cussed in the previous section for successfully deriving value from
freely available copies. First, the link between freely available re-
cordings and the demand for live performance is considered.
179. Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect Appropriability, supra note 96, at 956.
2009]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Second, the economic structure of the concert business is consi-
dered to determine whether it might support the recording busi-
ness.
A. The Link Between Freely Available Recordings and Demand
for Live Concerts
The link between free availability of recordings and demand for
live concerts is unlikely to be strong enough to replace the loss of
revenue from direct sales of recordings or even to sustain a small-
er recording business of any significant size. There are two rea-
sons. First, the link between free recordings and live concerts is
unlikely to be one of the stronger types of links-for example, a
case of indirect appropriation or bundling. Instead, free record-
ings may simply be a form of sampling or advertising for concerts.
Second, to the extent that freely available recordings do produce a
link, the nature of concerts and the concert market is likely to
undermine that link.
1. A Weak Link
The earlier discussion of alternative business models based on
allowing or tolerating copying or sharing described several exam-
ples where a content producer benefitted from a strong tie be-
tween a freely available work and a revenue-producing work. In a
case of indirect appropriation, journal publishers could charge the
library where patrons needed to go to copy a journal.so In a case
of a sharing-based model, television studios charge the broadcast
networks that, until a few years ago, were the sole source of favo-
rite shows for television viewers.18 1 In a case of a complementari-
ty, Red Hat charges its customers a premium for its expert sup-
port for free software that runs vital functions.18 2 In a case of a
bundling, Webkinz charges its customers a premium for plush
stuffed toys that come with a year of access to a popular online
game.183
180. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 94, 121 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 125-28, 157-63 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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The music business is unlikely ever to forge such a strong link
between freely available recordings and live concerts. The journal
and broadcast television examples simply do not fit-consumers
do not need to go to concerts to get copies of recordings as they
once needed to go to libraries to copy journals or watch television
broadcasts, with accompanying commercials, to view television
shows. High quality copies of recorded music are available from
many sources.
If concerts are a complement to recorded music, then they
would seem to be a weak one. They certainly are not as strong of
a complement as Red Hat's services are to Red Hat Enterprise
Linux. Modern companies need software to run their systems,
and they need to ensure that the software runs their systems re-
liably. For serious corporate customers, there is little point in us-
ing the software without the services to back it up. There is no
analog with respect to music. Consumers simply do not need to go
to concerts in order to enjoy recorded music.
On a more prosaic level, recorded music and concerts do not
even go together as well as the classic example of complements,
hot dogs and buns. Most people eat the two together-rarely does
a consumer leave a store with one and without the other. The
consumption of recorded music and concert tickets is separated in
time and place, and a consumer can easily enjoy one without the
other.
In contrast to these examples, people enjoy recorded music
without ever buying a concert ticket. In fact, given the inherent
limits of live performance, many people never get a chance to see
their favorite musicians perform. Mortality impedes some fans;
such is the case for fans of Jimi Hendrix or John Lennon. Inhe-
rent limits on supply frustrate others because sometimes, tickets
are impossible to find at any price-this year those unobtainable
tickets are for a superstar named Miley Cyrus beloved by young
teens. 184
Bundling could hold a bit more promise. In 2004, the musician
Prince gave away hundreds of thousands of copies of his CD "Mu-
184. The young performer is also known as Hannah Montana. See Randall Stross,
Hannah Montana Tickets on Sale! Oops, They're Gone, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, § 3, at
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sicology" to concertgoers.1 85 Reports said that concert ticket pric-
es included the cost of the CD.186 Later, in 2007, The Mail, a
United Kingdom newspaper, bundled Prince's "Planet Earth" CD
with newspapers.18 7 The newspaper paid Prince for the CDs,
which helped him publicize his twenty-one-date tour in the
U.K.188
Could musicians adopt the Webkinz strategy, selling their mu-
sic as part of a bundle? One difficulty is that bundling recordings
with concert tickets forces the consumer to wait until he attends a
concert, or at least buys a ticket, to possess a copy of the music.
This strategy may work for a well-established artist like Prince,
but it poses a chicken-egg problem for lesser-known artists. At
least some consumers will want to get to know an artist's music
before deciding to attend a concert. In addition, the Webkinz
bundling strategy relies on controlling access to the digital good
through unique product codes and passwords. If the record indus-
try could control access to its works, it would not be in so much
trouble. It is hard to charge a premium for a bundle when the
market is flooded with copies.18 9
Of all the positive effects of copying or sharing distilled from
the literature on the economics of copying, sampling seems most
likely to do some good for the music business. As an experience
good, 190 music is something that consumers are never sure they
like until after they consume it. Free previews can help to sell
such goods. Radio has long played this role, but it can never cater
perfectly to all tastes. Each station needs to aim its programming
at a relatively broad, local audience, as it needs to aggregate as
many listeners as possible to sell advertising. Freely available
downloads offer people a chance to sample a far greater variety of
music. More niche tastes may be served and cultivated.
Sampling will not work if samples supplant demand for the
original-but that is where concerts come in. In a digital world,
samples that are perfect digital copies do not serve to sell the
185. Randy Lewis, New Sales Strategy: Give It Away, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at E6.
186. Id.
187. Jon Pareles, The Once and Future Prince, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2007, at AR1.
188. Id.
189. See Johnson & Waldman, supra note 149, at 20 (describing how widespread copy-
ing undermines the linkages required for various alternative, copying-based business
models).
190. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
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original. However, such samples can help to sell an artist's other
work, which is not freely available, by telling consumers how it
might sound.191 For that reason, practically every musician now
has a web site or MySpace page with free downloads of selected
songs from the musician's catalog.192 The problem is that the
non-sampled music also leaks onto file sharing networks, which
means that the musician's entire catalogue is a free sample and
there is nothing left that the consumer must pay to obtain. Con-
certs do not pose this problem, as one must buy a ticket to enjoy
the experience of attending a concert.
The sampling of freely available music thus might inform con-
sumers of concerts they might like to attend. Without incurring a
monetary cost, they can acquire enough of an artist's repertoire to
determine what they might hear at a live performance and get an
idea of what the experience might be like. Of course, the congru-
ence is unlikely to be perfect. The live experience is different from
listening to studio recordings, and some performers are viewed as
better on stage than others. Still, if digital audio files could per-
fectly duplicate a concert experience, then the sampling effect
would not work, as the recordings would be replacements rather
than samples. Sampling that encourages concert attendance is
thus the best hope for generating positive effects from freely
available recordings.
Sampling will not work well as a business model, however, un-
less it increases demand for concerts rather than just shifting
demand to the concerts of one act from others. Will consumers at-
tend more concerts because they have an opportunity to sample
music online? The answer to this question must be "yes" for the
concert business generally if the business model is to be judged a
success compared to today's business models. Under the tradi-
tional model, new bands occasionally break out of obscurity by
giving away music, which has long been an important function of
the radio. Such success is likely at the expense of the market
share of other bands.
191. See Peitz & Waelbroeck, The Role of Sampling, supra note 124, at 908.
192. Michelle Quinn & Andrea Chang, The Nation: More Teens Dissing Discs in Favor
of Online Tunes, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, at Al; see also Posting of Dave Parrack to
TECH.BLORGE, http://tech.blorge.com/structure:0/020/2008/09/15/is-myspace-music.going-
to-revolutionise-the-music-industry/ (Sept. 15, 2008, 20:14 EST).
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One way that sampling might grow the entire business is by
ensuring that consumers are far more satisfied with their musical
choices. If customers are able to sample a broader variety of mu-
sic, then they are more likely to find the music in which they are
most interested. These more intensely interested consumers
might be more willing to go to concerts and might have a greater
willingness to pay. There is, however, a somewhat perverse alter-
nate outcome to this story. As Liebowitz points out, a more satis-
fied consumer might actually consume less music.193 Imperfect
information may lead a consumer to try more new bands in the
hope of satisfying his preference.1 94 A consumer with better in-
formation may become more quickly and fully satiated and, thus,
might settle down with a smaller number of more suitable prod-
ucts.
Even if sampling effects do not grow the concert business, they
may still provide a reason to produce recordings if the music
business is unable to stem the tide of unauthorized copying or
find other business models to support recording. Recordings may
simply become a cost of doing business-a way to provide con-
sumers with better information and to maintain a profile.
If recordings function solely as advertisements for concerts,
however, then their production will be constrained. As free adver-
tisements, they would no longer be a separate and large business,
but rather an additional expense for a business that is only a
fraction of the size of today's recording industry.
2. Characteristics of the Concert Market that Could Blunt
Sampling and Other Positive Effects
However strong the potential positive link between freely
available recordings and the concert business might be, the na-
ture of the concert market severely limits how strong that link
can be in reality. If the recording business relied entirely on con-
cert revenue to finance its expenses, then opportunities would be
severely constrained. Live performance is an economic activity
characterized by scarcity. As such, it suffers from a number of
limits.
193. Liebowitz, Economists' Topsy-Turvy View, supra note 99, at 8.
194. Id.
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First, the supply of concerts that any performer can produce is
limited by time and space. There are only 365 nights in a year,
and that number is further limited by travel time, rehearsal time,
recording time, fatigue, and other practicalities. Performers can
only be in one place at a time. In the short run, the supply of ve-
nues is largely fixed-places large enough to hold an audience are
not built overnight, and requisite permits and other preparations
take time. Moreover, the size of venues is limited. Stadiums and
arenas have been used for decades, but they seem to represent an
outer limit for the number of people that can practicably be enter-
tained in a live concert setting.195
Practical realities also constrain demand for live concerts.
Since concerts require the consumer to be at a particular place
during a particular time, they may impose a larger opportunity
cost than other leisure activities. If the times or dates are incon-
venient or conflict with other events or commitments, the con-
sumer may choose not to attend even if he has a strong interest in
the performer. Concert attendance also tends to demand more of
consumers than many leisure activities, as it typically involves
late evenings, crowds, and venues that serve alcohol and are
sometimes smoke-filled. Therefore, it is not an activity that ap-
peals to everyone or that can be enjoyed by everyone-for exam-
ple, some shows are not open to minors. A consumer must also
travel to the venue, which may be a significant cost if he does not
live nearby. In short, it is much easier to be a casual consumer of
recorded music than it is to be one of live concerts.
The concert market also faces a serious timing problem, at
least if it is to be tied to the market for recorded music. If a band
releases a recording that takes time to become popular but tours
immediately, it may find that its concert tour is ill-timed. New
fans may find that they missed the opportunity to see the band
play in or near their city, and interest may wane before the band
comes around again. Musicians face this problem now, but at
195. One-off outdoor events like festivals, political rallies, holiday celebrations, and
special free concerts are an exception. See, e.g., David Browne, Pop Life '97: Tunes Were
Empty, But the Coffers Were Full, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at 4 (noting that a Garth
Brooks concert in New York's Central Park drew one million fans). In fact, Bruno Frey has
observed that the reliance on festivals in Europe's classical music business appears to
arise from a need to contend with the inherent limits of live performance discussed in this
section. See Bruno Frey, Festivals, in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS 231, 231-35
(2003).
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least they still enjoy the benefit of consumer payment for record-
ings. If the only way to exploit a recording is through touring,
then timing problems become more serious. Then there are the
ultimate timing problems-once a band breaks up or a key mem-
ber dies, touring is no longer an option. The window for making a
living by touring is limited in both the short and long run.
In sum, even if freely available recordings increase the demand
for concerts, they may not increase it enough to matter. The per-
former may not be in the right place at the right time, or a con-
sumer might become more interested in seeing a performer, but
not so much as to overcome other limitations such as time, dis-
tance, or opportunity cost.
The limitations of touring seem particularly notable in contrast
to the ever-expanding horizons of the world of digital music. Rec-
orded music has a long shelf life, especially in a digital environ-
ment. Digital music files can be maintained and made available
commercially at a very low cost. 196 Devices like iPods allow con-
sumers to enjoy music in an increasingly wide variety of set-
tings.1 97 While concerts are characterized by scarcity, digital mu-
sic is now characterized by abundance.
The abundance of digital music is not just a matter of quantity;
it is characterized by a greater variety of musicians and genres.
Digital distribution has opened up greater opportunities for niche
performers. They can aggregate their small audiences to create
tremendous value. The fact that their fans are thin on the ground
matters little in the low transaction cost environment of the In-
ternet. In a recent popular online essay, business and technology
writer Kevin Kelly theorized that 1000 "true fans" might be
enough to support a creator in an online environment.198 He con-
tends that 1000 fans buying $100 worth of creative work and re-
lated merchandise might be enough to support an artist.199 The
online environment makes it possible to foster such a community
and keeps costs low enough to stay in touch with and to benefit
196. Posting of Kevin Kelly to the Technium, http://www.kk.org/thetechniumarchives/
2008/03/1000_true-fans.php (Mar. 4, 2008, 13:51 EST) [hereinafter posting of Kevin
Kelly].
197. See Apple, iPod Your Life, http://www.apple.com/ipod/ipodyourlife/ (last visited
Dec. 20, 2008).
198. See Posting of Kevin Kelly, supra note 196.
199. See id.
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from this audience. 200 While Kelly's numbers may have been a bit
optimistic, the concept is sound enough; lower transactions costs
create greater opportunities.
The opportunity to reach niche markets leads to the much-
lauded effect characterized as the "Long Tail."201 Retail stores
have limited space and no desire to carry inventory. They thus
stock a relatively small number of CDs that are likely to move
quickly. Online retailers, particularly digital music sellers like
iTunes, can afford to carry a vast multiple of this number. This
creates an opportunity for people to find more satisfactory choic-
es.
Relying on live concert revenue to support the music industry
essentially chops off the long tail. Billboard counted 3275 touring
acts in the U.S. last year.202 While the number seems large, it is
dwarfed by the number of artists with songs and albums being
sold by digital music stores-estimates are now in the millions.203
Fans can find almost anything they like online, and artists can
potentially find their "1000 true fans" in that environment. 204
The same is not likely to be true in the concert market. Unless
your 1000 true fans, or even 10,000 true fans, all happen to live in
the same city, then mounting a tour to reach them is an expen-
sive proposition.
The structure of the touring business makes it difficult for art-
ists to reach a widely dispersed audience created online. Unlike
the online world, it matters a great deal if your fans are thin on
the ground in the physical world of touring.
These simple facts make puzzling the enthusiasm for the tour-
ing model displayed by Long Tail originator Chris Anderson and
other Long Tail advocates. 205 At the very moment when new op-
portunities are opening up to artists and fans, some would send
them back to an old economy model of scarcity and limitations. It
is hard to link revenue-producing opportunities in a short-tail
200. See id.
201. See ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL, supra note 36, at 5-6, 10.
202. See Memorandum from Brad Powers, Research Assistant, Regarding Correspon-
dence with Billboard to Professor Mark Schultz, S. Ill. Sch. of Law 1 (Jan. 25, 2008) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum from Brad Powers].
203. See ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL, supra note 36, at 8.
204. See Posting of Kevin Kelly, supra note 196.
205. See Posting of Chris Anderson, supra note 3.
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world to a long-tail creative economy. The concert business is
poorly matched to the type of value created online-episodic, li-
mited-time events tied to aggregating fans in a physical place,
versus thinly spread, long-enduring niche interests. Unfortunate-
ly, the concert model is not just limited by its physical structure;
the financial structure poses some challenges as well.
B. The Prospects for the Live Concert Business as a Source of
Revenue for Financing the Recording Business
Notwithstanding the problem with weak links between record-
ed music and demand for live concerts, let us assume that the
music business attempted to move entirely to using concert reve-
nue to support the production of recorded music. Musicians and
bands would record music and freely distribute it for the purpose
of promoting their concert tours. Would the revenue and cost
structure of the industry support such a change? Could musicians
form small, vertically integrated organizations that finance re-
cording and touring out of the same pot of money?
Although some amount of vertical integration may be in the in-
dustry's future, touring revenues seem to be a shaky sole founda-
tion. Three problems with the concert industry lead to skepticism
that it can absorb the cost of making recordings and effectively
sustain both the concert business and the production of record-
ings at any level like the one we enjoy today. First, if recordings
and concerts are treated as jointly produced goods, then one can
see that the assumption that lost revenue from one product can
be made up from the other is fundamentally flawed. Second, the
music industry's touring revenues are heavily skewed toward a
handful of top performers. Third, as the cultural economics litera-
ture describes, live performance is subject to a "cost disease"-
ever-rising costs caused by stagnant productivity.
1. The Jointly Produced Goods Problem
It is often asserted that musicians make all their money by
touring. A typical version of this sentiment is quoted in Alan
Krueger and Marie Connolly's paper on "Rockonomics": Scott
Welch, the manager for Alanis Morisette and LeAnn Rimes,
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claims that "[t]he top 10% of artists make money selling records,
the rest go on tour."206
Although there may be reason to doubt that such assertions are
completely accurate, 207 they at least reflect the traditional divi-
sion of risk/reward in the industry. Record companies have long
advanced the money for recording and made musicians wait until
those costs were recouped, and then some, before they received
their share of proceeds via royalties.208 Meanwhile, performers
have gone on tours with little or no support from the record com-
pany, but have received more of those proceeds up front and
shared little of the revenue. 209 It has recently been suggested
that this division has pitted artists against record companies as
performers may encourage people to distribute recordings to
create a buzz to promote the touring portion of the business. 2 o
206. Marie Connolly & Alan B. Krueger, Rockonomics: The Economics of Popular Music
6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11282, 2005), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl1282.pdf.
207. The common assertion that musicians make most or all of their money from live
performance rather than recordings covers a lot of ground. It is probably true in some
senses but not in others. It is certainly true in the most trivial sense: if one accounts for
every musician that makes some money from performing, which would include every cover
band that plays in the local bar or fraternity house, then it seems certain that most pop
musicians make no money from recordings. If, however, the statement only applies to acts
that make studio recordings, then its accuracy is less certain. It is common to hear that
certain successful acts have never received royalties from sales of their recordings. See,
e.g., Posting of Eliot Van Buskirk to Wired Blog Network: Listening Post, http:/Iblog.
wired.com/music/2008/07/ lyle-lovett-nev.html#more (July 21, 2008, 15:49 EST) (pointing
to Lyle Lovett's track record of never "mak[ing] a dime" on record sales). However, the pic-
ture is complicated by the fact that performers typically receive advances before they
make the recording. See, e.g., id. (noting that Lyle Lovett's advances are so large that he
has never recouped them to the point of profiting from sales of his music). Although the
artists are obligated to pay recording expenses out of the advance, they still might retain
money from the advance. Then, depending on contractual arrangements, if they write
their own songs, they may make money from mechanical and performance royalties or the
sale of synchronization rights. See PASSMAN, supra note 20, at 114, 115. Some recording
artists rarely or never tour-Kate Bush, for example-see infra notes 339-40 and accom-
panying text, indicating that some performers can sustain themselves on revenues from
recordings. Moreover, because the recording industry probably relies on a relative handful
of hits for most of its revenue, see infra note 247 and accompanying text, royalties from
recordings may be quite large in the aggregate, but such royalties are concentrated in a
few superstars.
208. See PASSMAN, supra note 20, at 100.
209. Record companies once more commonly supported tours to promote performers,
but do so less often now, as tours are considered money-losers. Id. at 159. Record compa-
nies are now seeking to share touring revenue. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying
text.
210. See Gayer & Shy, supra note 74, at 375-76.
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These perceptions that musicians do not benefit from the re-
cording business apparently have led some commentators to be-
lieve that musicians would have little to lose from giving away
their music. Of course, financing for the recording would need to
come from somewhere, and some commentators assume that cost
could simply be shifted to the concert business. 211
There are problems with this logic. First, the numbers do not
match up well. According to data compiled by Krueger and Con-
nolly, revenue from concert tickets was $2.1 billion in 2003, while
revenue from the sales of recordings that year was $11.8 bil-
lion.212 It is hard to see how a business less than one-fifth of the
size of another can absorb the costs, let alone make up, the reve-
nue from the other, much larger business.
The numbers disparity points to a fairly basic economic concept
that some advocates of the live performance model may be over-
looking. Just because there are two markets in which musicians
can sell music does not mean that revenues lost in one can simply
be made up in the other.
The problem resembles the description of jointly produced
products that goes at least as far back as Alfred Marshall.213
Marshall's classic formulation discussed the production of beef
and hides, both of which came from cows. If the demand for one of
these products is reduced to zero (e.g., hides), then the production
of cows becomes less profitable and the size of the overall market
decreases. 214 Even if the hide seller is different from the butcher,
the lack of revenue from hides affects the supply of cows available
to the butcher and ultimately the market for beef.215 The rancher
cannot simply make up for the loss of hide revenue by charging
the butcher more.2 16
211. Connolly & Krueger, supra note 206, at 6.
212. See, e.g., Posting of Chris Anderson, supra note 3.
213. See 1 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS § V.VI 4, at 388-90 (9th ed.
1961). I am indebted to Stan Liebowitz for pointing out to me this way of viewing the prob-
lem.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id. As Marshall observed:
It more frequently happens that a business, or even an industry finds its ad-
vantage in using a good deal of the same plant, technical skill, and business
organization for several classes of products. In such cases the cost of anything
used for several purposes has to be defrayed by its fruits in all of them ....
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Substituting music for the cows in Marshall's example, the
same principles apply. Music, or perhaps a career in popular mu-
sic, has several outputs, including recordings and concerts. If de-
mand for purchased recordings is reduced to zero, then the pro-
duction of music becomes less profitable and the supply will be
reduced. Even if one granted the dubious assumption that no mu-
sician makes any money from recordings, record labels still serve
the function of financing the cost of production. If the recorded
music business no longer pays its part of the costs in the joint
production of music, then that cost must be borne by the live con-
cert business.217 If performers are to continue to record music
under these conditions, then they must either absorb costs or
pass them on to consumers in the form of increased concert ticket
prices.
2. The Superstar Problem
The concert market appears to be very lucrative simply in
terms of impressively large numbers. In 2007, Billboard reported
gross earnings of $2.6 billion for the concert industry, which was
comprised of 3275 headlining artists.218 It may appear that an
industry of this size could support some kind of recording indus-
try.
The distribution of rewards in the business is incredibly
skewed, however, which makes it a less likely candidate for sup-
porting the production of live recordings. The concert business is
a superstar market: a handful of musicians at the top of the con-
cert business make most of the money.219 Moreover, these top
earners have enjoyed dramatically increasing ticket prices in re-
cent years. 220 These top earners tend to be older, established art-
ists past the prime of their recording years. 221 Meanwhile, ticket
Id. at 390. The cost of the cow is defrayed in more than one market, as is the cost of mak-
ing music. If one of those markets disappears, the cost of making music increases and
supply decreases.
217. The costs may also be borne by other ancillary markets, such as merchandise or
licensing.
218. Memorandum from Brad Powers, supra note 202. Billboards reporting year runs
from November to November each year. Id.
219. See generally Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV.
845, 845 (1981) (introducing and describing the concept of superstar markets).
220. See infra note 231-33 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 241-48 and accompanying text & figs. 2, 3.
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prices for up-and-coming bands do not appear to be increasing at
the same rate.222
These facts point to a difficult reality. Much of the talk about
the increasing strength of the concert business does not neces-
sarily apply to those performers who still need to record to devel-
op fans. These newer performers would have a far less lucrative
pool of earnings from concerts upon which to draw if they were
required to finance their own recording costs from ticket revenue.
If each act is its own vertically integrated business, it really does
not matter much that top earners are doing well (except to those
top earners).
Using statistics provided by Billboard,223 I was able to deter-
mine the rather skewed distribution of rewards in the touring
market for 2007. As observed above, there were gross earnings of
$2.6 billion for 3275 headlining artists that reported to Bill-
board.224 The top twenty-five grossing tours, which represent on-
ly 0.76%225 of all reported tours, took home 53.25% of all reported
earnings ($1,384,411,310).226 The top twenty-five acts accounted
for about 36% of all 51,000,000 tickets sold in 2007.227 Figure 1
illustrates the skewed distribution.
222. See infra notes 234-40 and accompanying text & figs. 2, 3.
223. The numbers come mostly from the 2007 Year End Boxscores published in the De-
cember 22, 2007 issue. Top 25 Tours, BILLBOARD, Dec. 23, 2007, at 138 [hereinafter Top 25
Tours-2007]. However, Billboard was helpful in responding to inquiries regarding the
certain details, particularly the total number of acts that comprised the market that Bill-
board measured. Pollstar was not forthcoming. I thus used Billboard numbers while
Krueger's earlier study uses Pollstar numbers.
224. See Memorandum from Brad Powers, supra note 202.
225. The 0.76% is 25 top tours divided by 3,275 total tours. It is the percentage of top
tours in relation to total tours.
226. See Top 25 Tours-2007, supra note 223, at 138. This reported earnings figure
was calculated by adding the total gross of the top 25 tours as listed in Billboard. Id. The
53.25% is the reported earnings figure, $1,384,411,310, of the top 25 tours divided by the
total gross of all tours, $2.6 billion, as reported by Billboard. See supra note 202 and ac-
companying text.
227. The 36% is calculated by dividing the total attendance of the top 25 tours, as re-
ported by Top 25 Tours-2007, supra note 223, by the total tickets sold to all shows, as
reported by Memorandum from Brad Powers, supra note 202.
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Figure 1.
2007 Billboard Touring
Statistics(Percentage)
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In a study that used 2003 data from Pollstar magazine, Connol-
ly and Krueger reported a similarly skewed distribution. 228 In
2003, the top 1% of artists took in 56% of concert revenue. 229 The
top 5% took in 84%.230 In other words, the remaining 95% of art-
ists in Connolly and Krueger's sample shared the remaining 16%
of revenue. When looked at in this light, the initial magnitude of
the revenue numbers no longer appears as promising as it did in-
itially.
What about the high ticket prices that have been in the news?
Pollstar reported the average price at $62.07 during the first six
months of 2008.231 Connolly and Krueger found that for their
sample (a large sample of performers taken from Pollstar data),
"From 1981 to 1996, concert prices grew slightly faster than infla-
228. Connolly & Krueger, supra note 206, at 11.
229. Id. at 19.
230. Id.
231. Randy Lewis, No Downturn for Concert Industry, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2008, at
E17.
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tion: concert prices grew a compound 4.6 percent per year while
overall the consumer prices grew 3.7 percent per year."232 Things
took a drastic turn from 1996 to 2003 when concert prices grew at
8.9% against 2.3% inflation.233
These high prices might appear to be good for an industry that
has to make up its lost revenues from declining record sales
somewhere. Perhaps live performance is a luxury or superior
good-a good for which increases in income cause more than pro-
portional increases in demand.234 If that were the case, rising
wealth in society would likely support ever-increasing concert
prices. 23 5
Unfortunately, further investigation of the numbers paints a
less rosy picture. Bands in the middle tier--often the up-and-
coming bands-probably are not enjoying the same ticket price
inflation.
While it likely would be impossible to attempt to verify this
supposition for all bands across all shows, I have found a rough,
but useful and informative proxy. I examined ticket prices for five
Chicago concert venues in 1998 and 2008 to determine the infla-
tion in ticket prices during that period. The venues chosen were
Schuba's, Martyr's, Metro, the Park West, and the Double
Door. 2 36 These venues hold between 175 (Schuba's)237 and 1,100
232. Connolly & Krueger, supra note, 206, at 13.
233. Id.
234. See generally JAMES HEILBRUN & CHARLES M. GRAY, THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND
CULTURE 104 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing income elasticity and the arts).
235. See id.; see also Tyler Cowen & Robin Grier, Do Artists Suffer from a Cost Dis-
ease?, 8 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 5, 20 (1996) (arguing that rising wealth, among other fac-
tors, ameliorates the cost disease); David Throsby, The Production and Consumption of the
Arts: A View of Cultural Economics, 32 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 8 (1994) (discussing stu-
dies regarding income elasticity of demand for the performing arts).
236. A few more venues that fill this niche have opened in recent years, while others
have closed, but these five venues have been open during the entire time period. A few
others (for example, the Empty Bottle) also host smaller national acts, but have a prepon-
derance of local acts and no-cover shows. Confining the sample to these five venues helps
control several relevant variables (size of venue, type of acts booked, union/non-union, bar
revenues) throughout the time period. The neighborhoods in which the venues reside have
all become more upscale in the last ten years, but given the results, that fact does not ap-
pear to have influenced ticket prices. The sample includes 393 shows in the first eight
months of 2008 and 176 shows from the entire calendar year of 1998. Prices were taken
from the weekly concert announcement column in the Chicago Sun Times entitled "Ticket
Line," obtained from the Lexis Nexis database. See, e.g., TicketLine, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan.
18, 2008, at NC14. Shows with lower pre-sale prices were coded for that lower price in
both years.
237. E-mail from Matt Rucins, Schuba's, to Katie Kohm, University of Richmond Law
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(Metro).238 These are the clubs in Chicago that for the last ten
years have tended to host bands on the way up, on the way down,
or stuck in the middle-indie rock acts, jam bands, singer-
songwriters, local acts with followings, and newer acts in general.
In other words, these venues play host to the middle class of pop-
ular music. Figure 2 shows the results.
Figure 2.
Ticket Prices at Smaller-Sized Popular
Music Venues in Chicago 1998
Average Price, All 5 Venues Median Price, All 5 Venues
$14.19382022 $12
Schuba's Martyr's Metro Park West Double Door
Average Average Average Average Average
$10.75 $12.65384615 $14.94737 $18.33696 $10.75
Schuba's Martyr's Metro Park West Double Door
Median Median Median Median Median
$10 $12 $13.5 $16.5 $10
Review (Nov. 12, 2008, 2:28 EST) (on file with the University of Richmond Law Review).
238. Metro, General Info, www.metrochicago.com/info (last visited Dec. 20, 2008).
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Ticket Prices at Smaller-Sized Popular
Music Venues in Chicago 2008
Average Price, All 5 Venues Median Price, All 5 Venues
$14.68193384 $14
Schuba's Martyr's Metro Park West Double Door
Average Average Average Average Average
$12.7391304 $15.44117647 $16.96196 $24.95238 $10.97115
Schuba's Martyr's Metro Park West Double Door
Median Median Median Median Median
$12 $15 $16.5 $25 $10
Ticket prices in mid-level venues did not show the sort of infla-
tion that Connolly and Krueger found in overall prices during
earlier periods. 239 The average price rose only about fifty cents
across all venues, and though the median price did rise $2 (from
$12 to $14), that was well below the expected rise based on the
change in the consumer price index (CPI) for the period. 240
If ticket prices are skyrocketing, and if the increase is not oc-
curring in the middle tier of acts, what is driving the increase? A
common popular theory is that aging Baby Boomers and Gen-
Xers are wealthier and thus more willing to spend money to see
239. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
240. See The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, http://www.minneapolisfed.org/
(last visited Dec. 20, 2008) (using the CPI calculator, goods or services worth $14.00 in
2008 would have only cost $10.58 in 1998).
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the favorites of their youth. The Billboard top twenty-five touring
act charts appear to support this theory.24 1
I checked career length of the top twenty-five touring acts in
2007 and 2008. I used the Rolling Stone magazine online disco-
graphy for each of the acts in the top twenty-five 242 to determine
career length, based on the performer's first album. 243 The re-
sults are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3.
Average and Median Career Length
of Billboard Top Touring Acts
2006 2007
Average Median Average Median
21.35 16 22 15
There are few fresh, young acts among the top concert earners.
With an average career length of just over twenty-one years in
2006 and an average career length of twenty-two years in 2007,
these performers have had plenty of time to acquire a fan base.
Most are no longer pumping out hit music, either; fans enjoy the
older music they have long since acquired. As Billboard observed
in 2006, "As has been the case for more than a decade, 2006 is
top-heavy with veteran acts."244 The acts, such as the Police, the
Rolling Stones, Madonna, and Barbara Streisand, were, with a
few exceptions, "past their record-selling prime."245
People in the music business do not call these acts old-the po-
lite euphemism is "legacy act"-and the label is telling, as these
bands are living off the legacy of the good-old, pre-Napster days.
Concerns about paying for new recordings do not apply to most
legacy acts, as their hit music is, in a sense, a fully depreciated
241. See text accompanying notes 223-30 & fig. 1.
242. I ignored four special productions-Cirque de Soleil in both 1998 and 2008, the
American Idols Tour, and High School Musical.
243. There were a few judgment calls. For example, Justin Timberlake is credited for
his time with 'N Sync and Roger Waters is credited for his time with Pink Floyd. In both
cases, the performers gained tremendous fame through those associations. On the other
hand, Rod Stewart's time in the Jeff Beck Group and Faces, which pre-dated his solo ca-
reer, were not counted as those were not the source of his initial fame.
244. Ray Waddell, Burning up the Road: Both Dollars and Attendance Prove Touring Is
out of Its Slump, BILLBOARD, Dec. 23, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 22706812, at *5.
245. Id.
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asset. With the bulk of their royalty-earning potential behind
them, their interest is in getting exposure to advertise their tours.
As a result, file sharing is not as much of a concern for them.
Def Leppard guitarist Vivian Campbell recently observed that
Def Leppard's audience was getting younger due to re-discovery
of the band through file sharing. 246 He noted that the band was
"fortunate to have an absolute truckload of hits. It's actually very
difficult for us because we have to decide which songs to play."247
Of course, new bands do not have such a base upon which to
build. As Campbell conceded, "When kids trade files, it's actually
a good thing for classic bands such as us. It's not such a good
thing for up-and-coming artists who need to sell records."248
Industry veterans thus wonder where the next generation of
top touring acts will come from without years of industry promo-
tion and blockbuster hits.249 As one industry insider said,
"There's a little bit of a problem to that for the future.... Where
did our stars come from? They came from recorded music, from
breaking on radio. We've got to find new ways to break talent or
else we're going to run out of inventory."250
One answer might be the 360 deals discussed earlier, or other
revenue sharing deals that allow the recording industry to share
in the concert revenue success of older acts. 25 1 Such revenue
sharing might allow the labels to cross-subsidize newer acts with
a share of touring revenue, which is what the major labels cur-
rently do with recording revenue. 252 Eventually, those new acts
might develop into well-established acts with significant touring
revenue.
246. Christina Fuoco-Karasinski, Def Leppard Guitarist Sees the Bright Side of File
Trading, LIVE DAILY, Aug. 19, 2008, http://www.livedaily.comnews/14754.html.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See Ray Waddell, The Year in Touring, Billboard, http://www.billboard.combbcom/
yearendl2006/touring/index.jsp (last visited Dec. 20, 2008).
250. Id.
251. See discussion supra Part II.C.
252. This has long been the model, although some have grown discontent with it. Ear-
lier this year, the new Chairman of EMI Group, Guy Hands, complained that 85% of art-
ists signed to major labels lose money for the labels, and that EMI made most of its money
from a mere 200 of its 14,000 clients. Andre Paine, A Final Chorus for Many at EMI,
HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 15, 2008, at 4.
[Vol. 43:685
FUTURE OF THE MUSIC BUSINESS
Of course, established artists have observed the same facts,
and many are concluding that their interests are diverging from
the major labels and the new bands they are trying to break. Es-
tablished artists are looking to places other than record labels for
their new deals. Thus, acts such as the Eagles and AC/DC are
cutting exclusive deals with Wal-Mart; Madonna, U2, Jay-Z, and
others are looking to groundbreaking deals with organizations
such as LiveNation. 253 It is not in the interest of these estab-
lished acts to share revenue with record labels in order to subsid-
ize the development of future acts.
In the end, the numbers discussed here show a touring busi-
ness that is getting wealthier by getting older and living off estab-
lished hits. Meanwhile, price growth for the newer part of the
touring business that might support new recordings remains
stagnant. The numbers do not necessarily show a touring busi-
ness that is too poor to support a recording business, but the state
of the touring business is less promising than it appears at first
glance.
3. The "Cost Disease"
One more problem plagues the live concert business, making it
a less likely candidate to save the ailing recording business. Live
performance is a tough business, perhaps even tougher than all
those clich6d rock songs about life on the road make it out to be.
The cultural economics literature explains why this is so. William
Baumol and William Bowen launched the cultural economics field
with their 1966 study, The Performing Arts-The Economic Di-
lemma.254 Their landmark work set out "to explain the strained
economic circumstances which beset performing companies." 255
Baumol and Bowen concluded that the economic challenges
faced by the performing arts were not the result of historical acci-
dents or institutional arrangements, but rather "something fun-
damental in the economic order."256 According to Baumol and
Bowen, the economic dilemma of the performing arts is, at heart,
253. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
254. See BAUMOL & BOWEN, supra note 25.
255. William J. Baumol & William G. Bowen, On the Performing Arts: The Anatomy of
Their Economic Problems, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 495, 496 (1965).
256. Id. at 496-97.
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a productivity problem; the performing arts lag behind other sec-
tors of the economy in productivity growth. 257
The stagnant productivity of the performing arts results from
the fact that the labor of the performer is itself "the consumers'
good." 258 The problem is often stated in terms of the performance
of a Mozart quartet. In the eighteenth century, Mozart's Quartet
for Strings no. 19 in C major, K 465 took four performers around
forty minutes to perform. 259 In the intervening two hundred
years, there have been no "improvements" in the efficiency of the
live performance this piece, as it still takes four performers about
forty minutes to play it. More importantly, Baumol and Bowen
contended that the nature of the act of performance prevents
productivity gains.260 In other industries, consumers typically
welcome innovations that reduce the hours of labor or resources
required to produce the final product because they ultimately re-
duce the cost. Not so with respect to live performance, because
"[a]ny change in the training and skill of the performer or the
amount of time he spends before the audience affects the nature
of the service he supplies."261 As a result, "the arts cannot hope to
match the remarkable record of productivity growth achieved by
the economy as a whole."262
The more or less stagnant productivity of the performing arts
stands in stark contrast to the rest of the economy. For example,
the labor needed to produce an automobile has fallen dramatical-
ly in recent years. In 1983 it took General Motors about 135 man
hours to produce a car.263 Twenty-five years later, that number
had fallen to 32.29 hours per vehicle, marking fifteen consecutive
years of improvement in productivity. 264 By contrast, it took the
band Lynyrd Skynyrd 1.07 man hours to produce a performance
257. See id. at 500.
258. BAUMOL & BOWEN, supra note 27, at 164.
259. Cf. id. (discussing a 45-minute Schubert piece).
260. See id. at 165.
261. Id. at 164.
262. Id. at 165.
263. See Michael Brody, The Labor Showdown of the Decade, FORTUNE, Apr. 16, 1984.
at 128.
264. Press Release, Oliver Wyman, Lean Improvements, Worker Buyoutrs Bring De-
troit Three Productivity Closer to Asian Rivaals, Says Oliver Wyman's Harbour Report
2008 (June 5, 2006), available at http://www.oliverwyman.com/content-images/OWEN_
AutomotivePress_2008_HarbourReport08.pdf (summarizing proprietary report).
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of the song Freebird in 1977.265 Today, a band duplicating the
performance would still take 1.07 man hours. As Baumol and
Bowen observed, "[H]uman ingenuity has devised ways to reduce
the labor necessary to produce an automobile, but no one has yet
succeeded in decreasing the human effort expended at a live per-
formance of a forty-five minute Schubert quartet much below a
total of three man-hours."266
Critics often decry this single-minded focus on the act of per-
forming, as productivity gains in other factors employed in
putting on a production may offset rising unit labor costs. For ex-
ample, computerized lighting and air conditioning, which allow
for longer seasons, might cut costs. 267 This analysis also disre-
gards the contribution of factors such as capital investments in
performance technology and the productivity of set designers,
builders, marketers, ticket sellers, light operators, stagehands,
and managers. Tyler Cowen and Robin Grier have also observed
that more subtle improvements in the productivity of performers
is possible, as technology has fostered better communication
among artists, easier travel, improved health, easier access to
training, and recording technology that allows one to listen to,
and correct, practice performances more quickly. 268
Baumol and Bowen did not, however, wholly ignore the contri-
bution of other factors to the activity of staging a performance-
they just saw them as unable to ameliorate the inexorable cost
increases in the central, essential factor of the performer's la-
bor.269 For example, they noted that technology had improved the
efficiency of support activities like management and travel during
touring and had even improved activities that directly affected
265. The Freebird example was suggested by its use in a speech given by Alan Krueger.
See Alan B. Krueger, Bendheim Professor of Econ. and Pub. Affairs at Princeton Univ.,
Rockonomics: Economics & Public Policy in the Rock & Roll Industry (2002), available at
http://www.krueger.princeton.edu/columbia.ppt.
266. BAUMOL & BOWEN, supra note 25, at 164.
267. See HEILBRUN & GRAY, supra note 234 at 139.
268. Cowen & Grier, supra note 235, at 11. Douglas Dempster similarly speculates that
the unit productivity of symphony orchestras may be increasing because of an influx of
highly skilled musicians resulting from the "absurdly large number of American music
students (i.e., something on the order of 8,000 music students graduate from accredited
music programs each year) being trained for the profession of orchestral performance, and
trained at higher and higher levels .... " Douglas J. Dempster, The Wolf Report and Bau-
mol's Curse: The Economic Health of American Symphony Orchestras in the 1990s and
Beyond, 15 HARMONY 1, 20 (2002).
269. See BAUMOL & BOWEN, supra note 25, at 163.
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the performance, such as lighting and scene changes. 270 They
contended, however, that the benefit of all such cost-saving
measures is limited by the inability "to increase the hourly output
yield of the performer himself."271 The salaries of performers
"constitute the bulk of outlays of the performing organization." 272
Moreover, unlike other economic endeavors where labor is em-
ployed to create a product, the work of the performer is the prod-
uct and is thus irreducible. 27 3
In later work, Baumol concluded that the irreducible centrality
of the performer's work to the business of live performance would
ensure that live performance remained "asymptotically stag-
nant."274 As the costs of factors other than the performer's labor
fall-the factors capable of productivity improvement-they be-
come less significant. 275 The performer's labor once again comes
to make up a higher portion of costs, thus restarting the cost dis-
ease.
2 76
The stagnant productivity of the performing arts would not
present a challenge in a generally stagnant economy. 277 However,
in a growing market economy where other sectors are enjoying
increased productivity growth, the imbalance between the per-
forming arts and other sectors of the economy creates costs pres-
sure in the performing arts sector. 278 The more productive sectors
of the economy enjoy real wage increases, thus increasing the op-
portunity cost of choosing a career in less productive sectors like
the performing arts. 279 Although highly trained, dedicated per-
270. Id. at 163-64.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 164.
273. See id.
274. See Hilda Baumol & William J. Baumol, The Mass Media and the Cost Disease, in
ECONOMICS OF CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 109, 112 (W.S. Herndon et al. eds., 1984); William
J. Baumol et al., Unbalanced Growth Revisited: Asymptotic Stagnancy and New Evidence,
75 AM. ECON. REV. 806, 807-08, 815-16 (1985) [hereinafter Baumol et al., Unbalanced
Growth].
275. Baumol et al., Unbalanced Growth, supra note 274, at 807-08.
276. Baumol later broadened his claims regarding the cost disease, contending that it
affected other mass media, such as television. Baumol & Baumol, supra note 274, at 120.
Tyler Cowen criticizes the breadth of this claim, observing that the cost disease is a long
time coming in such industries: 'The potential for marketing and distributional improve-
ments is exhausted only when the product is no longer scarce." Tyler Cowen, Why I Do Not
Believe in the Cost Disease, 20 J. CULTURAL ECON. 207, 209 (1996).
277. See BAUMOL & BOWEN, supra note 25, at 167.
278. See id. at 171.
279. Id.
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formers may be less willing to switch careers than many other
types of workers, rising economic expectations and attractive al-
ternatives are likely to have some effect on the salaries musicians
are willing to accept. 280
In light of real wages rising in the general economy, organiza-
tions employing performers face three choices:
1. Raise wages only if justified by increased productivity
gains. Given the lagging productivity of the performing
arts, performers' wages would quickly fall behind wages
for the rest of the economy.
2. Keep up with increased wages in the general economy.
In the absence of productivity gains in the work of per-
formers, this strategy will cause unit labor costs to in-
crease inexorably.
3. Employ a compromise strategy where wages rise, but do
not keep up with the general economy. Both real wages
and unit labor costs will increase. In the end, perfor-
mers and their employers share the burden of lagging
productivity. 281
Baumol and Bowen argue that the third strategy is the one
that happens most often in practice. 282 Wages must increase
some, lest opportunity costs motivate current performers to
change careers and potential performers to choose more remu-
nerative work.283 However, performers seem to derive a great
deal of "psychic income" from their jobs and are thus willing to fo-
rego some monetary income. 284
Given constant productivity, however, "any increase in wage
rates, however modest, must lead to a corresponding increase in
costs." 285
280. Id. at 168. As Baumol and Bowen observe, performers seem to derive great satis-
faction from their careers. Id. at 169.
281. See id. at 168-69.
282. Id. at 169.
283. See Dempster, supra note 268, at 9.
284. BAUMOL & BOWEN, supra note 25, at 169. There is widespread anecdotal evidence
for this contention. It also follows from the relatively low return most performers receive
(low wages) for a very large investment in training, formal education, and practice. Id.
Performers receive a tremendously low return on human capital relative to other skilled
professions.
285. Id. at 170 (emphasis omitted).
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The central point of the argument is that for an activity such as the
live performing arts where productivity is stationary, every increase
in money wages will be translated automatically into an equivalent
increase in unit labor costs-there is no offsetting increase in output
per man-hour as there is in a rising productivity industry. 28 6
Technological progress thus becomes a curse, rather than a bless-
ing, for lagging industries like the performing arts, as it raises
their costs by creating wage pressure from rising wages every-
where else.
According to Baumol and Bowen, the allegedly grim conse-
quences of the cost disease are an inevitable reduction in the
quantity of artistic production, absent some government interven-
tion.28 7 The cost disease theory has led many to follow Baumol
and Bowen's call for government subsidy of the arts. As noted
earlier, Baumol and Bowen's cost disease study launched the field
of cultural economics, much of it devoted to the need for govern-
ment subsidy.288 Policymakers have followed this lead. Throsby
noted in his 1994 survey of cost disease literature:
In the 25 years following its initial presentation, this proposition
[the cost-disease] has been widely seized upon in a number of coun-
tries as spelling doom for the live arts unless governments inter-
vened, and both government funding agencies and the companies
they support have made much of the cost disease hypothesis in
pressing for ever more generous subsidies. 2 89
Empirical evidence collected by Baumol and Bowen at the time
of their study, and since, appears to support their contention-
costs have indeed risen in the business of live performance. 290
Productivity gains in support services do not seem to have made
up the difference.291 However, rising costs have not necessarily
286. Id. at 171.
287. There are a number of reasons this reduction occurs. First, there is a limit to the
increased costs that promoters can or are willing to absorb. Baumol and Bowen were par-
ticularly focused on non-profit arts groups, which typically have ambitious missions and
perennially strapped budgets. See id. at 15-32. For-profit promoters face even greater
pressures and also face the lure of more remunerative ways to employ capital. There is
also presumably a limit to the increased prices that ticket buyers will accept. Demand
cannot be completely inelastic. Moreover, in the non-profit world on which the original
study focused, organizations resist increasing ticket prices as their mission is to increase
public exposure to the arts.
288. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
289. Throsby, supra note 235, at 15.
290. BAUMOL & BOWEN, supra note 25, at 182.
291. Id. at 163-64.
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resulted in a decline in the supply of performances of the perform-
ing arts such as symphonies, 292 and certainly have not produced
a decline in the arts generally. 293
The reasons for this escape are not particularly mysterious.
Performers have either found ways to sidestep the cost disease by
finding subsidies (in the case of the traditional performing arts),
been rescued by a greater willingness to pay on the part of con-
sumers (as in the case of rock's legacy acts), or moved into new
activities that use recording technology and other advances. The
cost disease theory thus appears to have been accurate in predict-
ing an apparent challenge-rising costs-but at least partly inac-
curate in its prediction of consequences-declining production. It
thus may be possible to escape from the "inevitable" consequences
of the cost disease.
In the case of popular music, it is recording technology that has
been most important in allowing performers to improve their sta-
tus and escape the limitations of live performance. Copyright law
has been essential to the task in most cases. The next section fur-
ther considers the relative advantages and disadvantages of the
copyright-driven direct appropriation business model versus the
live-performance-based model for financing recordings.
V. LESSONS FOR THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT
IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY
Closer examination of the proposed concert-based model for fi-
nancing recordings reveals that it is likely less of a panacea than
many might wish, but it also reveals two important lessons about
copyright-enabled direct sales models. First, it is a useful remind-
er that copying is not always harmful and that productive busi-
ness models can be built on freely available copyrighted works.
Second, technology and copyright-based, direct sales models play
a very important role in escaping the inherent limitations of live
performance.
What emerges, I hope, is a fuller, more balanced understanding
of the potential role of "free" business models for supporting the
creation of recordings, particularly the ones that center on live
292. See Dempster, supra note 268, at 3.
293. See Cowen & Grier, supra note 235, at 20.
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performance. Just because creators do not need to exploit copy-
right fully in some instances, it does not follow that copyright
protection is unnecessary in all instances.
The following discussion examines these lessons in greater de-
tail. It first examines the potential benefits of alternative models
that tolerate or embrace copying. It then considers the essential
role of copyright in escaping the limitations of live performance.
Next, it considers which types of music might survive and which
types would wither in an industry that relied primarily on live
performance revenue. Finally, it concludes by placing this ar-
ticle's analysis in the broader context of trends in the music in-
dustry, looking beyond the viability of live performance alone for
supporting the creation of recordings.
A. Copying Is Not Always Harmful
The literature on the economics of copyright offers important
lessons regarding the potential benefits of tolerating copying or
sharing. Even if copying undermines the ability of the music in-
dustry to directly appropriate revenue by selling recordings to
consumers, performers may still be able to capture revenue indi-
rectly. These insights have important doctrinal implications for
copyright law, as others have observed. In particular, Michael
Meurer has pointed out these insights' relevance to fair use anal-
ysis. 294 When the effect of copying on the market for originals is
analyzed, it is essential to consider whether the copyright owner
is benefitting indirectly from copying.
Largely missing from the discussion thus far has been consid-
eration of consumer welfare. This discussion has been concerned
mainly with the viability of a proposed business model. Neverthe-
less, it is worth noting that having a cornucopia of music freely
available would vastly increase consumer welfare. The dynamic
effects of the free model, however, need to be considered as well; if
the model is not sustainable or reduces incentives, then there will
be less music produced and perhaps less variety. As discussed be-
low, these dynamic effects ought to be considered when assessing
consumer welfare as well.
294. See Meurer, supra note 113, at 932.
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Whatever their benefits, however, free business models cannot
magically transform lost revenue in one line of business into
gains in another. Theoretical models should not be embraced too
quickly without careful examination of the institutions and busi-
ness models that prevail in a particular market. This article's ex-
amination of the live performance business shows that it is likely
difficult to capture increased value from copying recorded music
via live performance. It is thus a poor candidate for supporting
the production of recordings through indirect revenue effects.
There are, however, instances where practice confirms theory,
as "free" models do benefit some acts. Older, legacy acts with a
large base of hits-such as Def Leppard-are finding that file
sharing increases their live concert business, although it does not
necessarily encourage them to create new music. 295 Radiohead
appears to have benefitted from its experiment with tip jars.296
Rather than passively hoping that freely available recordings
will prove to be a complement to the recording business, the mu-
sic business might try a more proactive approach. It could take
some inspiration from the success of bundling models such as the
popular children's toy Webkinz-if performers were to create ex-
plicit bundles of recordings and live performances or other goods,
they might be able to capture more revenue while inspiring fan
loyalty. Just as the Webkinz game serves to promote the sale of
Webkinz toys, 2 9 7 music fans may become more loyal if a relation-
ship is built with access to secure download sites and other perks.
For example, fans who purchase recordings could receive secure
codes that provide access to benefits such as exclusive downloads
of new songs or videos, streaming video of performances, oppor-
tunities to communicate with performers via chat or e-mail, or an
opportunity to purchase better concert tickets, merchandise, and
other memorabilia.
Such bundling strategies would need to overcome the threat
created by a potential flood of copying. However, my earlier work
indicates that fans may be more likely to respect the proprietary
rights of bands when they perceive a reciprocal connection. 298
295. See Olga Pierce, Hair Metal Grows Back on the Net, SEATTLE TIMES, May 5, 2008,
at C6.
296. Eduardo Porter, Radiohead's Warm Glow, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, at 11.
297. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
298. See Schultz, supra note 13, at 681.
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Webkinz is the more likely example than Redhat. Fans do not
need bands like corporate customers need Redhat, but they might
develop a bond of affection and loyalty if it is explicitly encour-
aged.
B. Escaping the Limitations of Live Performance
Almost uniquely among creators, and long before copyright ex-
isted, musicians had a continuing revenue stream from their own
work available to them. They could perform their music and
works created by others. For example, Mozart and Beethoven
were not only great composers; they were renowned performers.
The opportunity to make money by performing has helped ensure
that musicians always had a way to earn a living. Seen in this
light, copyright is a very late development in the history of mu-
sic. 299
Nevertheless, we should not be too quick to dismiss the addi-
tional opportunities copyright brings. Live performance is a tough
business for the performer. 300 It is also often disappointing for
the potential fan. The opportunities to enjoy a live performance
can be very limited, depending on where one lives and what one
can afford. Copyright has helped performers to overcome and
transcend the limitations of live performance. A new perspective
opens when copyright is considered in light of the cost disease's
productivity analysis and the other inherent limitations on live
performance. Escaping the strictures of live performance created
vast opportunities for popular musicians, both economic and ar-
tistic, as the following discussion considers.
1. The Vast Expansion of Popular Music Fueled by Technology
and Copyright
During the twentieth century, recording and broadcast tech-
nology vastly and dramatically expanded the potential audience
for a particular performance, to the great benefit of both perfor-
mers and consumers. Starting in the 1920s, radio and phono-
graphs brought music performed by professionals into people's
299. See Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came To View Musi-
cal Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405, 1408-09 (2004).
300. See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
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homes.301 As F.M. Scherer describes it, the consequences were
radical for both musicians and their audiences:
Those technological developments made music available and afford-
able to virtually all citizens of industrialized nations and trans-
formed the enjoyment of music by the middle classes from what had
been preponderantly a self-activated endeavor to a passive activity.
Instead of making music oneself, one could listen at home to music
performed by the best professionals. 30 2
Although popular music certainly existed before mass media
technology, it was a small-scale, homely affair. Performances took
place in the home, at local social gatherings, and at traveling
shows. Most performances were by amateurs. Audiences typically
were not large.
The result was a vast new market. As Scherer observed, eigh-
teenth- and nineteenth-century composers generally did not aim
their efforts at the mass-market, "if not because of an aversion to
popularization per se, then because the media for reaching those
audiences were so limited."303 Technological change enabled
composers and performers to reach these markets for the first
time, vastly expanding their reach and the productivity of, and
potential reward for, their efforts.
No longer is the listener constrained in place, or even in time.
As a result, some performances recorded decades ago continue to
be heard daily and likely have been replayed billions of times.
Such productivity gains are almost unfathomably vast over the
days when performances could only be heard live. Even today's
huge concerts, held in arenas, pale in comparison to the numbers
reached by a modest hit song. Those art forms, performers, and
organizations that take advantage of technology have enjoyed
vast benefits by creating new markets, embracing new forms of
creativity, and finding new audiences.
Copyright played a role in this story of technological transfor-
mation. The basic contours of the account are extremely familiar:
copyright protects a creator's ability to appropriate value from
her work, thus ensuring that she has sufficient incentives to
create more work. This account is fine as far as it goes, but the
301. See F.M. SCHERER, QUARTER NOTES AND BANK NOTES: THE ECONOMICS OF MUSIC
COMPOSITION IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 199 (2004).
302. Id.
303. Id.
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cultural economics literature puts copyright's role in a slightly
different light by illustrating the role of copyright in a dynamic
economy. Copyright enables musicians to reach ever-broader au-
diences by securing a potential return to the investment in pro-
duction and distribution technology.
While technology deserves most of the credit for the productivi-
ty gains in twentieth-century music, it is difficult for performers
to exploit the benefits of new technology without effective copy-
right laws and enforcement. The Copyright Act304 in the United
States and effective copyright laws in other countries following
the Berne Convention played a key role in the technological suc-
cess story of twentieth-century music.
The importance of copyright to enabling musicians to exploit
the benefits of technology is underscored by the plight of musi-
cians in countries without effective copyright enforcement. 305
Several African nations, notably Ghana and Zambia, once boasted
substantial recording facilities and record-pressing plants.306
Those facilities were out of business in the late 1980s in the face
of a flood of cassette tape piracy.307 Outside of South Africa, most
African music is now recorded in Paris or London.308 Those art-
ists who stay home in Africa-most of them-rely on perfor-
mance, which is an ever-more difficult, less rewarding business in
many countries. 309 Most African musicians make less on average
than their already poor countrymen. 310 Without effective copy-
right enforcement enabling high-productivity opportunities, the
music business remains a poorly compensated, labor intensive ac-
tivity.
Copyright thus has the virtue of making it worthwhile for com-
posers, performers, and distributors of music to employ new re-
cording and distribution technology. These technologies enable
304. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541-98 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006) amending 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (2006) and 44 U.S.C. §§ 505 &
2113) (2000)).
305. See generally Mark Schultz & Alec van Gelder, Creative Development: Helping
Poor Countries by Building Creative Industries, 97 KY. L.J. 79 (forthcoming 2009).
306. See id. at 129.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 126, 129.
309. Id. at 133 ('Dou Dou' Sow, a well known musician in Senegal ... who lives in dep-
lorable condition in Dakar, [said] 'there are less live performances today than in the old
days because there isn't enough money [to perform]."').
310. Id. at 126.
[Vol. 43:685
FUTURE OF THE MUSIC BUSINESS
enormous productivity gains over the next-best alternative for
supporting the creation and dissemination of music: live perfor-
mance. A broadcast or recording can potentially reach millions. A
recording can be replayed countless times. The output of a single
performance is thus potentially infinite. Moreover, unlike live
music where the size of a concert hall is ultimately limited, there
really is no reason to expect productivity improvements to cease
until recordings are essentially costless to distribute. As Cowen
and Grier observe, "[T]he potential for capital-intensive innova-
tions is exhausted when the product is no longer scarce." 311 The
key, however, is to ensure that it is worthwhile for producers of
music to invest in these capital-intensive technologies.
Copyright is the linchpin 'that makes investing in and employ-
ing these recording and distribution technologies worthwhile. It
allows producers of music to appropriate a small part of the vast
gains in productivity resulting from the use of these technologies.
With copyright, it becomes worthwhile to shift music production
from a labor-intensive industry to a capital-intensive one.
There is thus something anachronistic and perhaps ironic
about the advocacy of business models that rely on live perfor-
mance to support the recording business. It turns on its head a
business model that brought great progress and turns back the
clock.
2. The Artistic Opportunities Created by Direct Sales Business
Models
When musicians can sell recordings of their performances di-
rectly to consumers (with the support of copyright), it expands the
variety of music that is possible. In short, it allows performers to
become recording artists. Not all music or performers are well-
suited to the medium of live performance. Therefore, technology
creates new opportunities for such music and performers. It both
frees them from the limitations of live performance and gives
them new opportunities to craft sounds not easily reproducible on
the live stage.
The Beatles' Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band ("Sgt. Pep-
per's") is a great example of how recording technology creates a
311. Cowen & Grier, supra note 235 at 13.
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greater variety of artistic and commercial opportunities for art-
ists. The Beatles decided to leave touring behind forever in Au-
gust 1966.312 After a few years on the road playing to legions of
screaming fans, the Beatles wearied of poor quality performances
in which they could not hear themselves play. As George Harri-
son recalled, "The sound at our concerts was always bad and we
would be joking with each other on stage just to keep ourselves
amused. It was so impersonal. We were sick of it."313
Recording technology allowed the Beatles to perform in a dif-
ferent way for their fans, creating a sound that could not be re-
produced on the road. Sgt. Pepper's was something new in popu-
lar music, marking a transformation from performers into
recording artists. As Paul McCartney said, it was their declara-
tion that "[w]e were not boys, we were men ... artists rather than
just performers."314 Sgt. Pepper's took months to record-over
700 hours of studio time315-an effort with little precedent for
popular performers. The result was "an unsurpassed adventure in
concept, sound, songwriting, cover art and studio technology." 316
Sgt. Pepper's may have been, as Rolling Stone proclaimed, the
greatest rock album of all time, 317 but it was most certainly not
an album to be duplicated on stage. With its strings, sound ef-
fects, and other demanding parts, it was truly a studio project.
The album was an artistic and technological masterpiece, not an
advertisement for a touring band. Indeed, the band never went on
tour again. If their only way to earn a return on that investment
were to tour, Sgt. Pepper's would have been a waste of time.
Sound effects and string sections are poor advertising for what a
four-piece band can do on the stage. Using recordings as a free
sample to advertise a tour is a difficult way to justify expensive
studio recordings.
312. See The Guardian, Beatles-Key Dates, http://www.guardian.co.uk/thebeatles/
page/0,11302,607848,00.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2008).
313. MARK HAYWARD & KEITH BADMAN, THE BEATLES UNSEEN 201 (2005).
314. BARRY MILES & PAUL MGCARTNEY: MANY YEARS FROM Now 303 (1997).
315. ROLLING STONE: THE 500 GREATEST ALBUMS OF ALL TIME 10 (Joe Levy ed., 2005).
316. Id. at 9.
317. Id.
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C. Relying on Live Performance: Survivors, Winners, and Losers
The music business would hardly cease to exist if it had to rely
entirely on live performance. Some artists thrive on live perfor-
mance; some do not. It is quite plausible that those artists who
benefitted from touring, or the organizations that employed them,
would continue to produce recordings. Madonna's deal with con-
cert promoter Live Nation is built on exactly such a model. Nev-
ertheless, there would certainly be losses beyond just a reduction
in the quantity of recordings. 31 8 Certain types of performers and
music would do better than others, thus curtailing the variety of
music. Highlighting some of these possible changes helps to fur-
ther point out the role of direct sales and copyright in sustaining
a diverse music industry.
1. Survivors and Winners
In a music business that relied primarily on touring, winners-
or at least survivors-still recording would likely include virtuoso
performers who tour extensively with large followings of fans. A
number of rock bands, especially jam bands, fit this description.
These performers and their fans value large repertoires, great
improvisational skill, and ever-changing set lists.319 For example,
the Grateful Dead was a top-earning touring act with studio al-
bums that were relatively few and far between and frequently de-
rided as disappointing. 320 The Grateful Dead benefitted from a
loyal following of fans known as Dead Heads who attended mul-
tiple shows, some of them willing to forego mainstream jobs to fol-
low the band.321 Today, the Dave Matthews Band occupies a simi-
lar niche, consistently among the top twenty-five touring acts,
with fans greatly enamored with their live playing.322 Such bands
play many types of music: progressive rock, Americana-tinged
318. As discussed earlier, supporting the cost of joint production (recordings and per-
formance) with one revenue stream instead of two would likely reduce the quantity of re-
cordings, especially where the remaining revenue stream-performance-is a fraction of
the size of the abandoned revenue stream-recordings. See supra Part IV.
319. Schultz, supra note 13, at 668-75.
320. See generally DENNIS MCNALLY, A LONG STRANGE TRIP: THE INSIDE HISTORY OF
THE GRATEFUL DEAD (2002).
321. See id. at 385-90.
322. See Top 25 Tours-2007, supra note 223; Top 25 Tours, BILLBOARD, Dec. 23, 2006,
at YE-90 [hereinafter Top 25 Tours-2006].
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country rock, bluegrass, and jazz are among the more favored
styles.323 Regardless of genre, when they produce recorded music,
it tends to be of two types: recordings of concerts or studio record-
ings that focus on sophisticated instrumentation and jamming (or
"noodling," to critics). Many enjoy this style of music, but not all,
and in any event it only represents a small subset of the recorded
music available today.
Performers who have built up "brands" would likely continue to
produce recordings to maintain visibility and popularity as they
toured. As discussed earlier, many well-established acts with
large catalogs of hits-a legacy from the days of large record
sales-make money from touring and sometimes still produce
new records to aid in promoting their tours.324 Arguably, top per-
formers like the Police and the Rolling Stones are now just as
much brands as bands: people buy concert tickets, t-shirts, DVDs,
and other band-related paraphernalia as part of their devotion to
the "brand." Although some legacy performers continue to pro-
duce compelling new music, others are accused of resting on their
laurels.325 In any event, a long-running question is where such
artists would come from without the opportunity to build up a ca-
reer with revenue from recordings and promotional support from
a record business that earns money from those recordings.
Other performers who build brands through celebrity status,
sex appeal, savvy marketing, and investment might also continue
recording to maintain their fame. Such performers make money
from touring and ancillary revenue, with recording often a sec-
ondary or tertiary source of income. Pop idols, divas, and hip-hop
impresarios such as Jay-Z, Jessica Simpson, Jennifer Lopez,
Beyonc6 Knowles, Sean "Diddy" Combs, 50 Cent, C6line Dion,
and Miley "Hannah Montana" Cyrus build lucrative multi-media
empires by starring in movies and commercials, releasing their
own lines of clothing, cosmetics, fragrances, and jewelry, building
production companies, and otherwise exploiting their brands.
323. See generally DEAN BUDNICK, JAMBANDS: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE PLAYERS,
MUSIC, & SCENE (2003).
324. See supra Part IV.B.2.
325. See, e.g., Jim Farber, Guns 'N Roses' Long-Awaited Album 'Chinese Democracy'
Finally Arrives, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 22, 2008, http://www.nydailynews.comentertain
mentimusic2008/11/22/2008-11-22_guns-n roses longawaitedalbumschinese-d.html ("So
Big Foot has finally arrived-that mythic beast few believed they'd ever see in their life-
times.").
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These ancillary lines of revenue can prove quite lucrative.326 For
example, rapper 50 Cent's career as a celebrity investor paid off
handsomely in 2007 when he made $100 million-after taxes-
from the sale of VitaminWater brand manufacturer Glac6au to
Coca-Cola.327
The type of music created by celebrity performers is hard to ca-
tegorize, as celebrity is a serendipitous phenomenon. Still, two
clear trends are apparent. First, some brand-name performers,
particularly hip-hop artists, built their fame and initial fortunes
on recording revenue, and many still earn large amounts from re-
cording. 328 It would be harder for such artists to gain initial trac-
tion without recording revenue. Second, many brand-name per-
formers are female vocalists whose recordings tend to put their
vocal prowess front and center, for example, Beyonc6 or C6line
Dion, or whose images are built on sex appeal, for example, Jessi-
ca Simpson. As with bands that improvise heavily, many consum-
ers enjoy this type of music, but not all. In addition, these per-
formers only represent a subset of what is currently available in
the market for recordings.
Musical spectacles or media events such as the Fox network's
American Idol singing competition also do not depend on direct
sales to consumers to build and sustain their audience and com-
mercial success. Over the last several years, American Idol has
enthralled tens of millions and launched the careers of several
pop stars.329 American Idol's formula for success is similar to that
of a sporting event-the excitement and immediacy of watching a
competition, plus the shared communal experience of watching it
unfold with millions of other people. Because the experience is en-
joyed live, much like a sporting event, there is little point in re-
watching old episodes. American Idol also launched a fairly suc-
326. The performers in this category regularly are found in Forbes' annual list of the
100 most powerful celebrities. See Matthew Miller, The World's Most Powerful Celebrities,
FORBES, June 11, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/06/11/most-powerful-celebrities-lists-
celebrities08-cx-mn_0611cland.html.
327. See Michael Miller, The Celebrity 100: 50 Cent, FORBES, June 11, 2008, http://
www.forbes.com/lists/2008/53/celebrities08_50-Cent M80Q.html.
328. For example, Kanye West has made a great deal of money from his own hit
records and the hit records he has written for others. See Michael Miller, The Celebrity
100: Kanye West, FORBES, June 11, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/lists2008/53/celebrities
08_Kanye-WestTDFX.html.
329. See Jonathon Berlin, Is Idol Still a Hitmaker?, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 2008, at 65.
The show started in 2002. Id.
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cessful live touring show-in 2006, the "American Idols Live"
tour, featuring performers from that year's show, took in over $35
million.330 Although studio versions of contestant performances
are currently released on iTunes, American Idol produces very lit-
tle truly new music-the songs performed are almost all old stan-
dards or popular hits from the past five decades.331 Nevertheless,
American Idol and similar events have served to launch a few
lucky artists, such as Carrie Underwood, into superstar status,
quickly developing their "brands" and allowing them to forego
years of building a catalog of hits.332
Patronage might even make a comeback of sorts via corporate
sponsorship of recordings, regardless of touring. Recently, the
William Wrigley Jr. Co. paid pop stars to record and release songs
that were extended jingles for its DoubleMint gum. 33 3 Chris
Brown's "Forever" reached number four on the charts and was on-
ly later revealed to be a commissioned song.33 4 The use of popular
music in TV shows as theme songs and background music has al-
so become a more important source of revenue for popular mu-
sic. 335 Although such opportunities are lucrative, they may re-
duce the variety of music, as artists who work under commission
tend to lack artistic freedom.336
Finally, plenty of part-time and amateur musicians would still
record music. With recording tools like DigiDesign's Pro Tools
330. Top 25 Tours-2006, supra note 322.
331. See 'Idol' on iTunes, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 2008, at 36. Many American Idol contes-
tants go on to recording careers, but they then face the same issues as all other recording
artists.
332. Berlin, supra note 329.
333. Ethan Smith & Julie Jargon, Chew on This: Hit Song Is a Gum Jingle, WALL ST.
J., July 28, 2008, at B1.
334. Id.
335. Noel Holston, Pop Goes the Soundtrack for Prime-time Shows; Memorable Music
Replacing Orchestral Cues, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 26, 2002, at N8.
336. During an earlier era of patronage, many composers chafed under the strictures of
patronage. For example, the composer Joseph Haydn once celebrated leaving behind the
patronage of the Esterhazys, which was rather secure and relatively undemanding. For
him, artistic independence trumped economic security:
How sweet this bit of freedom really is! I had a kind Prince, but sometimes I
was forced to be dependent on base souls. I often sighed for release, and now I
have it in some measure. I appreciate the good sides of all this, too, though
my mind is burdened with far more work. The realization that I am no bond-
servant makes ample amend for all my toils.
Scherer, supra note 301, at 93.
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software selling for prices accessible to the average consumer, 337
more music than ever is being recorded out of passion, vanity,
and the hope of starting a career. Modern tools allow fairly pro-
fessional-sounding music to be recorded by amateurs. Still, ama-
teurs do not have the benefit of services of recording engineers,
session musicians, or other professionals.
2. Losers
Some types of musical recordings would likely suffer in a world
without copyright. Not every type of music or performer does well
on the stage.
The most certain casualties would be performers who do not
tour. Just as some performers are better live than recorded, some
are better studio performers than they are live ones. The Beatles
are not the only example of an act that chose to spend its time in
the studio rather than on tour.338 For example, Kate Bush, one of
the most successful singer/songwriters of the last three decades,
toured only once in her career, in 1979.339 Not only is the lush in-
strumentation of her albums unsuited to the road, but also she
simply is not comfortable performing. 340 Instead, she spends
years in the studio perfecting her work.341
One might conclude that in a world where touring is king, acts
like the Beatles and Kate Bush might simply be forced to tour,
but the results would not be so limited. If recorded music is, at
best, an advertisement for live performance, then it simply does
not pay to spend countless hours in the studio polishing an album
that cannot be duplicated on stage. There is not much point in in-
dulging a band like the Beatles to create an album such as Sgt.
Pepper's, or motivation to create any of Kate Bush's work. There
simply is not enough time to spend many months or years in the
studio if an act needs to get on the road to make money.
337. Pro Tools is the standard software currently used by most professionals and ama-
teurs for digital recording. See JOHN KEANE, THE MUSICIAN'S GUIDE TO PRO TOOLS xxi
(2004). It is available in consumer editions that sell for less than $100, with various pro-
fessional versions and equipment packages selling for more.
338. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
339. See Kate Bush News & Information: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.ka
tebushnews.comlfaq.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2008).
340. Id.
341. Id.
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Certain types of music would also not be supported well by live
performance, as they do not draw live crowds. While media spec-
tacles like American Idol do well, conversely, music that is not vi-
sually compelling falls flat on the stage. Electronic music is a dif-
ficult sell to live audiences. Similarly, rap music is rarely a top
seller on the touring circuit.342
Finally, consumers might be the losers. Although consumer
surplus 343 would seemingly increase from free access to record-
ings, consumer welfare suffers when the variety of choices availa-
ble to consumers is reduced. As Christopher Yoo has argued,
copyright theory ought to account more fully for the implications
of products differentiation.344 The market for recorded music con-
sists of differentiated rather than homogenous products. As Yoo
observes, in such a market, "works compete not only by offering
cheaper prices, but also by incorporating attributes that come
closer to particular customers' ideal preferences. The multidi-
mensionality of this competition makes simple price-cost compar-
isons an incomplete way to determine social welfare." 345 For a
product like music, variety is thus an important benefit to con-
sumers that ought to be considered in discussing welfare.
The benefit of variety is hard to measure, but one study that
attempted to do so underscores its importance to consumers. Erik
Brynjolfson and his colleagues attempted to measure the gains
from e-commerce in 2000.346 They concluded that the gain in va-
riety from the larger stock of online bookstores such as Ama-
zon.com produced far more consumer surplus than the lower pric-
es-variety increased consumer surplus by up to ten times as
much as lower prices. 347 There were two primary reasons that in-
creased variety was so beneficial: first, consumers were able to
purchase books when they might have made no purchase at all;
342. Don Waller, Who's the Hottest Star on Rap's Biggest Tour?, USA TODAY, July 13,
2008, at 50.
343. Consumer surplus is the difference between what a consumer is willing to pay and
what they actually pay for a good.
344. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.
U. L. REV. 212 (2004).
345. Id. at 252.
346. Erik Brynjolfsson et al., Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the
Value of Increased Product Variety at Online Booksellers 1 (MIT Sloan, Working Paper No.
4305-03, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=400940.
347. Id. at 25.
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second, consumers found more satisfying choices, for which they
would have been more willing to pay. 348
Similarly, consumer welfare could very well suffer from the de-
crease in variety of recordings that would likely result from rely-
ing solely on touring to finance the production of recordings. The
potential gain in consumer surplus from free recordings seems
great if one assumes that the recording market could remain the
same size after prices dropped to zero. If the number and variety
of recordings decreased, however, the gain likely would be less. If
a consumer could not find music he liked, then the zero price
would not generate any surplus. If a consumer were less satisfied
with the music that is available for free, and thus likely less will-
ing to pay, the gain in consumer surplus would also be reduced or
perhaps negated.
The net effect on consumer surplus would depend on how the
gains from reduced cost would balance against the losses from re-
duced variety. Regardless, a move to a market where recordings
are free would not be entirely without cost to consumers. To put
the result in qualitative terms, a music business without record-
ings such as Sgt. Pepper's would be seen by many as greatly di-
minished.
D. A More Complete View of the Music Business
The discussion in this article has critically analyzed assertions
that touring is the future of the music business. By necessity, it
has taken seriously the idea that recordings would be given away
freely with touring revenue supporting the production of record-
ings. This exercise is worthwhile. Considering the music business
in this light highlights the weaknesses of live performance as a
sole means of support for the music business. It also shows how
the music business and consumers benefit from the existence of a
direct market for recordings, supported by copyright. Too often,
the harm from file sharing and the benefits of copyright enforce-
ment have been dismissed with glib assertions about making up
the revenue with more touring.
Nevertheless, I ought to observe that portraying the future of
the recording business as a choice between selling recordings to
348. See id. at 25-27.
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consumers on the one hand and the proposed live performance
business model on the other is far too stark and far from com-
plete. For one thing, the pop music business relies on many reve-
nue streams besides selling recordings and concert tickets. Royal-
ties to composers for performances from radio stations, TV
networks, retail establishments, bars, and restaurants are an im-
portant and significant revenue stream. 349 Synchronization
rights for commercials, televisions shows, video games, and mov-
ies are another significant source of revenue. 350 Ringtones have
proven lucrative. 351 Ancillary products, like t-shirts and other
merchandise, are an increasingly important source of revenue for
all performers. 352 The presence of these many alternate revenue
streams ensures that the music business will never be faced with
the difficult task of supporting the production of recordings solely
through touring revenue.
In addition, whatever the future of the recording business
might be, it is unlikely to be dominated solely by today's fading
incumbents or to rely on only a few, clear business models, as it
once did. Although times are difficult, it is also a time of great op-
portunity. Many new players are rising and many new business
models are possible with lower production costs, cheap distribu-
tion, and easier connections with fans. Some acts may indeed find
it helpful at various stages of their careers to release their music
free of charge and rely only on concert revenue. Other acts may
find it useful to rely on 360 deals with record labels, promoters, or
managers to develop their careers. As long as consumers are per-
suaded to pay for music by some means-moral persuasion, legal
enforcement, bundling, or technological measures-both perfor-
mers and consumers will benefit from the increased variety and
possibilities. If the direct sale model fails completely, then some
349. David Bernstein, Music Royalties Rise, Even as CD Sales Fall, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,
2006, at C6.
350. See Eric Pfanner, Advertisements with a Pop Beat Bring Fresh Revenue to Singers
Young and Old, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2006, at C6.
351. Edna Gundersen, Mastertones Ring Up Profits: With Millions Sold Every Week,
Record Labels Are Reveling in Revenue, Promotional Potential, USA TODAY, Nov. 29, 2006,
at 1D.
352. For example, U2 signed a deal with Live Nation in April 2008 that covers promot-
ing U2's concerts, licensing the band's name and image, and manufacturing and market-
ing U2-related merchandise. Ethan Smith, Promoter Expands Reach with U2, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 31, 2008, at B4.
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second-best solution, like blanket licensing, likely will be neces-
sary.353
The future of the record business cannot be assured, however,
simply by giving away recordings as advertising for concert tours.
As much as this proposal may seem to be a straw man when sub-
jected to thoroughgoing analysis, it is asserted repeatedly by fans,
commentators, and scholars.354 This article shows the argument
for what it is: wishful thinking at best, and a cynical rationaliza-
tion at worst. While giving away music as advertising can help
some acts in some circumstances, it is not likely to lead to a large,
diverse supply of recordings. The live performance business mod-
el thus does not justify disposing with copyright. It also cannot
justify widespread, systemic copying as fair use, or provide a poli-
cy justification for not imposing secondary liability for such copy-
ing.355
A great virtue of copyright is that it does not preclude any al-
ternative business model that makes a virtue of giving up some or
all control over copying or distribution of creative works. Copy-
right, like all other property rights, leaves a vast amount of dis-
cretion to the owner. If free distribution of recordings makes
sense, then performers are free to embrace such a model. If free
distribution does not make sense, then performers ought to be
able to reject the model.
VI. CONCLUSION
While live performance could support some kind of music in-
dustry, it would be much more difficult than some seem to think.
Many celebrate the benefits of the creative destruction unleashed
by digital technology, and there are indeed vast benefits, but the
costs are often understated. The purpose of this article is to high-
353. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
355. As noted earlier, the existence of concert revenue has been cited as a reason for
treating file sharing as fair use or at lease avoiding secondary liability. See supra notes
85-92 and accompanying text. In very specific instances, benefits from copying or sharing
might provide a policy or doctrinal justification for excusing copyright liability. For exam-
ple, if consumers' willingness to pay for a CD contemplates ripping the CD for use on an
MP3 player, then that use does not harm the market for CDs, as record labels are already
indirectly appropriating the value of that use. It would thus seem to be a case of fair use,
or even implied licensing. Such case-by-case analyses are necessary, however, rather than
blanket excuses based on the theoretical economic benefits of copying or sharing.
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light the costs of less effective copyright protection. We might lose
some of the variety and vitality of the music market-both
present and future artists who are unable to benefit from touring
revenue or other alternative support.
The links between freely available music and the touring busi-
ness probably are not strong enough to support the production of
substantial recorded music. Moreover, the structure of the live
performance business does not make it a promising cash cow. A
handful of aging artists make the lion's share of the money made
touring. Touring also experiences rising costs.
The challenging economics of the live performance business
hardly doom it. For nearly one hundred years, performers have
enjoyed increasing revenues and greater prestige by exploiting
the market for recordings. Current proposals stand this model on
its head by forcing a business product created using new technol-
ogy (digital copying and the Internet) to depend on very old tech-
nology (live performance). Instead, experience seems to show that
the performing arts are most likely to prosper if they can ride the
same wave of technological progress that the rest of society is en-
joying. This may be where the music industry has really failed
thus far-it has been slow to figure out how to exploit the in-
creased productivity and expanded opportunities enabled by new
technology.
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